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INTRODUCTION
Conflicts between religious freedom and equality law are
unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Take for example
Masterpiece Cakeshop, which is currently pending before the
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Supreme Court of the United States.1 After a Christian baker
refused to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, Colorado
found that he had violated the state’s public accommodations
law, which protects customers against discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. Challenging that determination, the
baker is arguing that serving the couple would have contravened
his religious beliefs, and he is claiming protection under the
speech and religion clauses of the First Amendment.
Or consider Barber v. Bryant, a challenge to Mississippi’s
H.B. 1523.2 That law specifies three beliefs—that marriage
should be confined to different-sex couples, that sex outside
marriage is wrong, and that gender identity should be fixed at
birth—and it provides robust protection for those who hold such
beliefs, even against state civil rights law. A federal district court
invalidated the law on constitutional grounds.3 A federal First
Amendment Defense Act, which bears some resemblance to the
Mississippi law, has been considered by Congress and it has the
support of President Trump.4
Or consider the Attorney General’s Memorandum on
Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, which sets out
guidelines for all federal agencies.5 It endorses a broad vision of
1 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017)
(granting cert.). Notably, the Solicitor General filed a brief in support of the baker, even
though no federal statute is involved. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n,
2017 WL 4004530 (filed Sept. 7, 2017).
2 2016 Miss. Laws H.B. 1523.
3 Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677 (2016). That decision was reversed for lack of
standing. Barber v. Bryant, 872 F.3d 671 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 2018 WL
311355 (2018). I signed an amicus brief in support of the appellees. Brief of Church-State
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance, 2016 WL
7438560 (5th Cir. filed Dec. 22, 2016).
4 First Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Congress (2015–2016), § 3(a); Mary
Emily O’Hara, First Amendment Defense Act Looms Over Sessions’ Confirmation Vote,
NBC NEWS, Jan. 30, 2017, http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/first-amendmentdefense-act-looms-over-sessions-confirmation-vote-n714226. See also H.R. Comm. On
Oversight And Gov’t Reform: Hearing on H.R. 2802, the First Amendment Defense Act
(FADA), 114th Cong. 6 (July 12, 2016) (testimony of Professor Katherine Franke),
https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2016-07-12-Franke-ColumbiaLaw-Testimony.pdf.
5 Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty, 82 Fed. Reg. 49668 (Oct. 26, 2017);
see also Naomi Goldenberg, An Appraisal of Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age by
Nelson Tebbe: Eight Commentaries and Tebbe’s Response, __ J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. __, at
*4–*5 (forthcoming, 2018) (analyzing use of the category of religion in the Attorney
General’s memorandum).
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religious freedom, including in situations where it conflicts with
equality law. For example, the memorandum broadens a key
exemption from employment discrimination law.6 And it
maintains that religious exemptions may be extended even in
situations where they entail harm to others.7 (Such third-party
harms often accompany religious exemptions from civil rights
laws.8)
Although many more examples could be given, think
finally of the Trump Administration’s decision to expand
religious and moral exemptions from the “contraception
mandate.” Promulgated by the Obama Administration under
authority of the Affordable Care Act, the contraception mandate
protects women by requiring employers who provide health
insurance to include coverage for women’s contraception. In two
regulations, the Trump Administration now has allowed
employers with religious or moral objections to opt out of the
contraception requirement.9 A federal court has enjoined both
rules, finding that they violate the Administrative Procedure Act
and that they are not required by the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act.10

6 82 Fed. Reg. at 46970. This provision is similar to the Russell Amendment, which
had been proposed in Congress but never enacted. Current law allows religious
organizations to hire only members of the same faith, despite the general prohibition on
religious discrimination. Section 702 of Title VII, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. Going
further, the Russell Amendment would have allowed these groups to terminate workers
for refusing to follow tenets of the faith. Amendment to H.R. 4909 Offered by Mr. Russell
of
Oklahoma
(Apr.
27,
2016),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20160427/104832/BILLS-114-HR4909-R000604Amdt-232r2.pdf. So a worker could be terminated for becoming pregnant out of wedlock,
even if she remained a member of the church. And that worker could be fired even when
that would otherwise amount to discrimination on the basis of a protected ground, such as
sex or even pregnancy itself. The Russell Amendment draws its language from the
Americans With Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d)(2) (“a religious organization may
require that all applicants and employees conform to the religious tenets of such
organization”). See Douglas Laycock, Defense Authorization Bill Needs To Protect
Religious Liberty, THE HILL, Nov. 17, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/congressblog/labor/306539-defense-authorization-bill-needs-to-protect-religious-liberty.
7 Id.
8 See Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2534 (2015) (exploring the connection
between complicity claims and third-party harms).
9 82 Fed. Reg. 47792 (Oct. 6, 2017); 82 Fed. Reg. 47838 (Oct. 6, 2017).
10 Pennsylvania v. Trump, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2017 WL 6398465, at *17–*18 (E.D. Pa.
2017).
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In Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age, I offered a
way to understand and resolve such conflicts between religious
freedom and equality law.11 After proposing a method called
social coherence, I deployed it to develop four principles that can
guide constitutional decision-making on such questions. I then
used that method and those principles to suggest solutions in
specific areas of legal controversy. My arguments have now
drawn six thoughtful responses, published together in the
current issue of the Journal of Civil Rights & Economic
Development.12
In this Reply, I explore some larger questions that have
been prompted by the book but that fell outside its focus on the
interaction between religious freedom and civil rights law.
Spurred by the responses, but also independent of them, I
examine the implications of my arguments for an egalitarian
theory of the First Amendment. Though it is of course impossible
to fully develop such a vision in this Reply, there is room to begin
that work. Along the way, I answer some of the more pointed
questions posed in these six responses.
In Part I below, I begin by considering challenges to the
enterprise of religious freedom jurisprudence from critical
theorists. Here, I am most interested in arguments from
academic scholars of religion.13 In influential work, these writers
argue that the category of religion is too unstable and

11 NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE (2017).
12 Carlos A. Ball, Against LGBT Exceptionalism in Religious Exemptions from

Antidiscrimination Obligations, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 233 (2018); Alan Brownstein,
Attempting to Engage in Socially Coherent Dialogue about Religious Liberty and Equality,
31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 71 (2018); Chad Flanders, In (Partial) Praise of (Some)
Compromise: Comments on Tebbe, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 201 (2018); Andrew
Koppelman, Tebbe and Reflective Equilibrium, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 125 (2018);
Patricia Marino, What Is the “Social” in “Social Coherence?” Commentary on Nelson
Tebbe’s Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 115 (2018);
Laura Underkuffler, Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age: Rejecting Doctrinal
Nihilism in the Adjudication of Religious Claims, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 217 (2018).
13 Several responses to the book from critical theorists of religion have been collected
in a forthcoming roundtable in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion.
Contributions from critical theorists include Christoph Baumgartner, But There Is No
Conceptual Level Playing Field! Challenges to Nelson Tebbe’s Social Cohesion Approach to
Religious Diversity, __ J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. __ (forthcoming, 2018); Janet Jakobsen,
Equality of Religious Freedom,__ J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. __ (forthcoming, 2018); and Roberto
Blancarte, Let’s Be Reasonable!, __ J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. __ (forthcoming, 2018). My reply
is Reasons and Religion, __ J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. __ (forthcoming, 2018).
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ideologically inflected for use in legal administration.14 They also
contend that emphasizing religious freedom distorts our
understanding of cultural conflicts and deepens divisions among
social groups.15 Underlying both of these arguments is skepticism
about the project of secular constitutionalism generally—doubt
about its reliance on unstable distinctions between secular and
religious, public and private, group and individual.
Critical work on religion deserves to be taken seriously,
not least because some of its critiques are convincing. For
example, academic scholars of religion are right to highlight the
contestability of the category of religion. That term has no
universal referent, and it has been deployed in ways that benefit
powerful interests and ideologies. That the category of religion is
contingent does not mean that it cannot be used by particular
actors in particular institutional settings, however. It can be
defined differently in different doctrinal contexts and for
different purposes. I argue that the term religion should be
specified according to the variegated values that drive particular
doctrines.
So “religion”
may mean one thing for
nondiscrimination law under the First Amendment and it might
mean another thing for religious exemptions.16 Proceeding this
way brings together critical and constructive approaches to
religious freedom.
An implication is that the category of religion can, and
often should, include beliefs and practices that are considered
nonreligious in colloquial discourse. That raises the related
question of whether religion ought to be treated with special
solicitude in constitutional law. I address that question in Part
II, where I argue explicitly that there are no good reasons to
exclude certain convictions of conscience from most areas of
religious freedom doctrine. Categorically excluding nonreligious
commitments from free exercise and nonestablishment risks
serious unfairness, while including them selectively can further
the rationales for enacting and enforcing those provisions in the
first place.
14 For citations, see infra Part I.A.
15 For citations, see infra Part I.B.
16 For an earlier version of this argument, Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV.

1111, 1130–40 (2011).
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A significant development here comes from Andrew
Koppelman, who is a leading defender of the view that religion is
special in constitutional law. He has now clarified that courts can
and should protect convictions of conscience alongside familiar
religion.17 Koppelman resists those that would supplant the
category of religion in American law, not those who would
supplement it with analogous categories.18 So in one important
sense, Koppelman has acknowledged that religion is not special. I
endorse this move, and I give reasons for retaining the category
of religion even though its place in the First Amendment is not
unique.
Part III concerns a question that follows naturally: In a
world where religion is not special, how should we conceptualize
First Amendment law? Unlike some other egalitarians, I do not
propose to eliminate religious exemptions from general laws.
Religious actors can and should be relieved from government
regulations where doing so would not inordinately harm the
public interest. Nor do I argue that the Establishment Clause
should cease to be enforced—far from it. But my commitments to
strong enforcement of free exercise and nonestablishment seem
to sit uneasily with a conviction that religion is not special.
Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age did not take up
this general puzzle, focusing instead on the particular conflict
between religious freedom and civil rights law. And although it
described a method for thinking through such disputes, it
specifically avoided articulating a substantive theory of religious
freedom. But in this symposium, critics are inviting me to explore
the implications of the book’s arguments for a general theory.
Again, I cannot defend such a theory in this Reply but I can
describe why the puzzle is solvable in principle.
Accordingly, I suggest in Part III that religious freedom
law is consistent with a framework of full and equal membership
in the polity. Full membership means that government cannot
unreasonably thwart the exercise of basic capacities. It includes
the right to believe and practice according to the dictates of
17 In addition to his contribution to this symposium, see Andrew M. Koppelman,
“Religion” as a Bundle of Legal Proxies: Reply to Micah Schwartzman, 51 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1079 (2014).
18 I also respond to pragmatic arguments by Alan Brownstein.
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religion, conscience, and comparable commitments. Equal
membership guarantees that government will avoid constituting
classes of people as subordinate. For example, officials cannot
endorse a particular religion because that would relegate
nonadherents to an inferior legal status. Together, these
imperatives provide a framework that has the potential to make
sense of the religion clauses in the context of secular
constitutionalism. They organize the values that inform specific
legal rules.
Part III also responds to a complaint that the book is too
conservative in one respect—in its argument for a robust freedom
of association. As I explain, this critique misapprehends both the
scope of the associational interest and the stipulation that it can
be overbalanced by government imperatives.
Understanding the religion clauses as guaranteeing free
and equal membership has implications for a challenge to civil
rights law that is prominent at the moment, namely the
argument from symmetry. On this view, religious traditionalists
themselves are at risk of being relegated to a disfavored
citizenship status, not by private discrimination, but instead by a
liberal orthodoxy in government policymaking and its refusal to
grant sufficient religious exemptions. In Part IV, I address this
argument. Whether it is correct depends on law’s expressive
impact, and on social meanings. Certainly, it is possible to
imagine scenarios where religious traditionalists could suffer
citizenship degradation as a consequence of civil rights laws. But
neither the logic of antidiscrimination laws nor the actual cases
that have arisen so far suggest that such a risk is imminent or
equivalent to the structural injustice experienced by other
groups.
In Part V, I correct several misimpressions about the
method of social coherence. Two insightful commentators, Chad
Flanders and Patricia Marino, think that the method is designed
to generate some sort of legal consensus or agreement. Once that
interpretation is corrected, their concerns about the method
should ease. Social coherence is designed not to generate
consensus or even lower tensions, but merely to preserve the
possibility of reason giving.
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In a short conclusion, I urge critical theorists and left
egalitarians to come together behind something like my vision of
conscience and equality. Lawyers and theorists can and should
argue for full and equal membership without conceding that the
category of religion should dominate the discussion, and without
becoming complacent about the political dynamics that inevitably
influence First Amendment law.
I. Critical Theories
Today, religious freedom jurisprudence is drawing
skepticism from (at least) two directions. Academic scholars of
religion, writing mostly from the political left, question the
integrity of the category itself, as well as the uses to which it has
been put by governments and other powerful actors.19 And some
legal scholars, writing mostly from the political right, question
whether religion-clause law can be rationalized, or whether legal
decisions in this area are necessarily patternless, arbitrary, or
irrational.20 Together, these critiques pose fundamental
challenges not just to First Amendment law, but to the project of
liberal constitutionalism. Part of my aim here is to show that
they deserve to be taken seriously.
Having addressed legal scholars in the book,21 I focus here
on critical scholars of religion. My conclusion is that they are
mostly right to say that existing religious freedom law is
unstable and unprincipled, but that their critique can be turned
to constructive ends. If we recognize that the category of
religion—and the idea of religious freedom—can and should be
specified according to the values that properly drive First
Amendment analysis in particular contexts, then we can allow
those values to dictate the scope and strength of protection in
each area. That way, we can push constitutional law beyond the
category of religion itself, as it has conventionally been conceived.
The success of that project then depends on the persuasiveness of
its arguments, which are explored throughout the rest of this
Reply.
19 See notes infra Part I.A, and I.B.
20 See infra note 52.
21 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 25–48.
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A. First Wave Critiques
It is helpful to organize critical theories of religion into
two waves. In the first wave, scholars interrogated the category
of religion itself. Of course, efforts to define the term had long
occupied the field of religious studies. Some scholars had tried to
organize the concept substantively, by isolating characteristics
that all religions shared.22 Others had developed functional
approaches that highlighted the role of beliefs and practices in
the construction and reproduction of social groups.23
Departing from both of these approaches, critical scholars
questioned whether the category of religion could be defined at
all, or without serious costs. Talal Asad, in seminal work, argued
that the category has no universal referent.24 No single attribute,
and no cluster of attributes, can distinguish all religions from
nonreligion. Even the notion of divinity or superhuman power is
absent from, say, Theravada Buddhism, which is commonly
considered an important strain of a major world religion.
Asad explained this instability by pointing to the history
of the concept, which was curiously infrequent in early Western
thought.25 Dividing peoples into faith traditions was a

22 The dominant substantive approach defines religion as a cultural complex of beliefs
and practices that relate to the superhuman or supernatural. See MARTIN RIESEBRODT,
THE PROMISE OF SALVATION: A THEORY OF RELIGION 74–75 (2010) (discussing and citing
MELFORD E. SPIRO, RELIGION: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION, IN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF RELIGION 96 (Michael Banton ed.,
1966)); see also Jonathan Z. Smith, Religion, Religions, Religious, in CRITICAL TERMS FOR
RELIGIOUS STUDIES 269, 281 (Mark C. Taylor, ed., 1998) (“The anthropological definition
of religion that has gained widespread assent among scholars of religion . . . is that
formulated by Melford E. Spiro, ‘an institution consisting of culturally patterned
interaction with culturally postulated superhuman beings.’”). Bruce Lincoln proposes a
similar definition that nevertheless is “polythetic and flexible.” BRUCE LINCOLN, HOLY
TERRORS: THINKING ABOUT RELIGION AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 5 (2003).
23 Durkheim argued that religious beliefs work to bind people together into social or
cultural groups. ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE: A
STUDY IN RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY 41 (1915). He described religion as “a unified system of
beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and
forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community . . . all
those who adhere to them.” Id. at 44. Geertz extended the functional understanding of
religion, emphasizing the role of language in group formation. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 90 (1973).
24 TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM (1993).
25 Religion or “religio” was first used in Europe to describe forms of Christian
monasticism. Smith, supra note 22, at 269–270.
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surprisingly late development, in other words. When the term
religion did become more prominent, it often functioned to
describe the beliefs and practices of others, particularly colonized
subjects. And today, the diversity of definitions among scholars of
religion supports the contention that the term has no fixed
referent.26
Asad made two further arguments that have been
particularly influential. First, he pointed out that the leading
definitions tended to emphasize individuality, inwardness, and
privacy.27 That tendency led to misapprehension of traditions
that emphasized physical practices or community identification
rather than moral or theological conviction. Second and related,
he explained that the conventional understanding of religion had
roots in European Protestantism that distorted its application to
nonwestern cultures.28 That was especially concerning where
deployment of the term had political ramifications.29
Building on Asad’s work, scholars interested in legal
discourses and institutions began to argue that the category of
religion was too indeterminate and ideological to be used in
jurisprudence. For example, Winnifred Fallers Sullivan
conducted careful empirical studies of religious freedom
litigation, focusing on the difficulty that courts were having
deciding whether actual practices qualified for protection under
free exercise doctrine. One of her conclusions was that the
category of religion, and therefore the doctrine of religious
freedom, could not be deployed by courts without unacceptable
distortion.30
B. Second-Wave Critiques
In the second wave of critical work, religion scholars have
highlighted the actual use of religious freedom in political and
26 Cécile Laborde calls this the “semantic” critique of religious freedom. CÉCILE
LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 18 (2017).
27 ASAD, supra note 24, at 45–57; see also RIESEBRODT, supra note 22, at 8; ELIZABETH
SHAKMAN HURD, BEYOND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 55–58 (2015) (on Asad).
28 “My argument,” he wrote, “is that there cannot be a universal definition of
religion. . . .” ASAD, supra note 24, at 29.
29 Laborde calls this the “Protestant” critique. LABORDE, supra note 26, at 21.
30 WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 8, 10,
150–51 (2005).
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legal discourses. They have diagnosed the distortions and
divisions that result when the secular state uses religious
freedom as the dominant template for understanding diverse
instances of injustice.
For example, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd identifies the
costs of privileging religious freedom as the sole or primary
concern of international efforts to help suffering peoples.31
Looking for violations of religious freedom, as international
programs often do, not only risks overlooking other forms of
government wrongdoing, but it also can incentivize groups to
identify as religious. According to Hurd, that incentive ossifies
group differences that once were fluid and it prompts people to
understand their own traditions in terms of individual belief
rather than ritual practices or communal identifications.
Similarly, Saba Mahmood warns against the distorting
effects of religious liberty discourse on debates over the political
plight of Coptic Christians in Egypt.32 Inspired by Asad, she
argues that regulation of religion by the secular state not only
has disempowered such groups but also has transformed them.
As religion has become increasingly important to their identity, it
has contributed to division and inequality. Promoted by the U.S.
government and private patrons in the American evangelical
movement, the concept of religious freedom has worked to worsen
the “precarious position of religious minorities in the polity.”33
Emphasis on religious freedom and human rights, therefore,
risks unintended consequences in actual political practice.34
Importantly, the critique of these authors is not limited to
religious freedom and human rights, but it extends to the project
of the “secular” state itself. In their view, secularism and
neutrality, as government ideals, are intertwined with the
concept of free exercise. These political ideas work together to
distort social phenomena, to deepen political divisions along

31 HURD, supra note 27, at 63.
32 SABA MAHMOOD, RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCE IN A SECULAR AGE, 15 (2016); see also

Camille
Robcis,
Decolonizing
Secularism,
SYNDICATE,
July
11,
2016,
https://syndicate.network/symposia/theology/religious-difference-in-a-secular-age/.
33 MAHMOOD, supra note 32, at 15–17.
34 Laborde calls this the “realist” critique—her third and final type of critical
argument against religious freedom. LABORDE, supra note 26, at 13.
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religious lines, and to disempower groups that are now
constituted as religious minorities.35
Much of this work—both first-wave and second-wave—is
powerful and persuasive. Religious freedom law is infamously
unstable, and one source of its instability is the difficulty of
drawing lines around the category of religion.36 For example, it is
difficult to explain why atheists and agnostics are considered by
courts to be “religious,” and it is even more difficult to explain
why they are protected in some cases but not others.37 Moreover,
doctrines on free exercise and nonestablishment have been
articulated and applied in ways that regularly—some would say,
systematically—disfavor religious minorities whose traditions do
not center on individual belief or conscience.38 Some might
conclude that constitutional doctrine in this area cannot be
rationalized.
Yet critical theorists of religious freedom can be
understood in another way—and understanding them that way
opens up new pathways for thinking about legal protection and
political principles. On this alternative view, their key insight is
not that it is impossible to define the term religion, but that it is
impossible to define it universally.39 According to J.Z. Smith, for
example, the lesson that we should draw from observing that
scholars have proposed many different definitions is not that the
term religion cannot be defined, but that it can be defined in
35 See, e.g., MAHMOOD, supra note 32, at 3 (“This book is primarily concerned with
political secularism, particularly the modern state’s production and regulation of religious
differences in one region of the Middle east . . . .”).
36 Legal scholars have had their own debate about the definition of religion—a debate
that has been almost entirely isolated from work in the academic study of religion. For a
review, see Tebbe, supra note 16, at 1130-1140. That said, courts do not frequently have
trouble discerning whether a particular practice counts as religious.
37 See generally id. (investigating when nonbelievers should fall under the purview of
the religion clauses).
38 See, e.g., FRANK RAVITCH, FREEDOM’S EDGE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, SEXUAL
FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 114 (“religious minorities (especially nonChristian religious minorities) did not reap great benefits from Sherbert [v. Verner]”).
39 ASAD, supra note 24, at 29 (“[m]y argument . . . is that there cannot be a universal
definition of religion”); HURD, supra note 27, at 19 (“Neither religions nor religious actors
are singular, agentive forces that can be analyzed, quantified, engaged, celebrated, or
condemned—and divided between good and bad. To rely for policy purposes on the
category of religious actor is, rather, to presume a certain form of actorship motivated by
religion that is neither intellectually coherent nor sociologically defensible. It is something
that is claimed about a particular group by a particular authority in a specific context.”).
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many different ways.40 Religion is a second-order concept that is
amenable to being specified for diverse purposes in diverse
institutional settings.
Viewed this way, critical work suggests that we should
understand the term religion in the First Amendment in a way
that is substantive and disaggregated. While there may be no
definition of religion that applies in all legal settings, the effort to
protect religious freedom need not be abandoned altogether.41
Rather, it is possible to circumscribe the right according to the
purposes of the particular legal doctrine being applied in a
particular context.
This approach is substantive, rather than formal, because
it determines who falls within the domain of a legal rule
according to the values driving that rule.42 In other words, what
counts as “religion” depends on the purposes of doctrine
concerning free exercise, or nonestablishment, or equal
protection. This is similar to Cécile Laborde’s “interpretive”
approach to the concept of religion—”what matters,” she says, “is
that the law, or the theory, expresses and protects the correct
underlying values.”43
And my approach is disaggregated, rather than unitary or
monistic, because it recognizes that plural values may drive First
Amendment law. For example, the rule against denominational
discrimination pursues a commitment to government
evenhandedness among sects,44 while the ministerial exception
seeks to prevent government interference in the relationship
between clergy and congregation, among other commitments.45 I
have defended this variegated view of First Amendment law in
40
41
42
43
44

Smith, supra note 22, at 269, 281.
Critical legal scholars can sometimes be read to suggest this.
Tebbe, supra note 16, at 1131–1136.
LABORDE, supra note 26, at 20.
See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, 246 (1982) (“The clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred
over another.”). For more on the rule against government preferentialism among sects or
denominations, see Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1319–22
(2008).
45 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S.
171, 188 (2012) (recognizing the ministerial exception). For an articulation of the concern
with government interference in the relationship between clergy and congregation, see
Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2006). For other values
informing the ministerial exception, see Tebbe, supra note 16, at 1167–69.
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other writings.46 What it means here is that what counts as “free
exercise” or “nonestablishment” will differ according to the
differing
substantive
commitments
undergirding
the
jurisprudence.
Part of the reason this insight helps to address critiques of
religious freedom is that, as it turns out, few of the convictions
that drive the legal doctrine are specific to religion. As I will
explain below, there is little reason to differentiate religion from
nonreligion for purposes of constitutional law. That argument,
together with other normative advances, rectifies many of the
distortions and divisions identified by these theorists.
But will this approach satisfy critical scholars of religion?
Won’t they object that any substantive values that may be
identified as important to the jurisprudence—equal citizenship,
individual autonomy, etc.—themselves carry dangers of
inaccuracy and ideological distortion like the ones that plagued
religious freedom? More abstractly, will they object that the
dynamics they identify are intrinsic to secular government, and
cannot be expunged from within the framework of liberal
constitutionalism?
That is possible. Yet two responses convince me that the
critical and constructive projects can reinforce each other,
nevertheless. First, critical theorists themselves do not
categorically reject the possibility of normative argument. In fact,
as Laborde points out, their analysis is often performed in the
service of normative aspirations that remain unelaborated if not
unarticulated.47 So Winnifred Sullivan worries that the unfair
treatment of nonreligious objectors implicates “the principle of
equality” and presents “a question of justice.”48 And Peter
Danchin discusses the decision of a Jewish school to use religious

46 Tebbe, supra note 16, at 1127–30. Here too, my approach resembles Laborde’s
“disaggregated” method of determining the scope and strength of legal protection for
religion and conscience. LABORDE, supra note 26, at 2–3. See also Cecile Laborde, Religion
in the Law: The Disaggregation Approach, 34 L. & PHIL. 581, 593–94 (2015).
47 LABORDE, supra note 26, at 18. See also Tebbe, supra note 13, at 5 (noting that
Baumgartner makes normative arguments that are intelligible in constitutional law and
political theory).
48 SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 150.
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criteria in admissions as “a matter of justice.”49 The most
charitable, and I think the most accurate, reading of these
remarks is not that normative argument is being smuggled in,
but rather that it falls outside the focus of these scholars’ work.
And that is perfectly appropriate; diagnostic argument can be
valuable in itself.
Mahmood is perhaps most explicit about this. She refers
repeatedly to ideals such as “universal equality and citizenship”50
and “the undelivered promise of formal political equality.”51 And
she says plainly that she is not denouncing secular government
wholesale.52 Rather, her project is to “deprive[] [secular
government] of innocence and neutrality so as to craft, perhaps, a
different future.”53 This is a normative aspiration, and she
understands that. Of course, Mahmood appreciates the
limitations of liberal argument—but she also allows for the
possibility of reform, even if pursuing it is not part of her own
project. Laborde is right that “critical theorists [that] denounce
normativity as a system of ideological domination . . . miss out on
the critical potential of normative philosophy.”54 But Mahmood
does not make that mistake. Instead, she allows for the two
projects to coexist and even to benefit from each other.
My second response to the deep critique of secular
government is to say that whether it can be rehabilitated
depends on the success of substantive proposals. For instance,
whether the scope of free exercise protection can vary according
to its underlying commitments depends on how well that
approach works in practice. And whether the scope of
nonestablishment law can track values such as full and equal
membership for all persons will depend on the persuasiveness of
particular projects. Laborde is right about this, too.55 Normative
49 LABORDE, supra note 26, at 18 n.13 (quoting Peter Danchin, Religious Freedom as a
Technology of Modern Secular Governance, in INSTITUTIONALIZING RIGHTS AND RELIGION:
COMPETING SUPREMACIES 184, 204 (Leora Batnitzky & Hanoch Dagan eds., 2017)).
50 MAHMOOD, supra note 32, at 19.
51 Id. at 20.
52 Id. at 21.
53 Id.
54 LABORDE, supra note 26, at 18.
55 Id. at 14–15 (noting that some of the arguments of the “critical religion school” can
be answered only with the kinds of detailed arguments that she offers in the rest of her
book).
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theory must prove through its performance that the tensions of
secular constitutionalism can be successfully managed.
In the remainder of this Reply, I will explore several
aspects of that project. One foundational question is how secular
government can remain evenhanded—not only among religions,
but also between religion and other forms of profound human
commitment and identification. Egalitarians have answered that
religion cannot justifiably enjoy unique status in constitutional
law. Part II examines how that conviction can be squared with
existing doctrine, which is built around a constitutional text that
singles out the free exercise and nonestablishment of “religion.”
Another foundational question is how a jurisprudence that
observes equality between religion and other forms of conscience
and community can protect free exercise and nonestablishment,
without diluting either guarantee. I address that tension in Part
III.
Before turning to those issues, let me briefly address
another type of skepticism that denies the very possibility of
rational argument in legal institutions. That sort of theory has
become influential within the legal academy.
In the book, I engage with legal scholars who take critical
approaches to religious freedom from a perspective that is
sympathetic to religious traditionalism. My focus there is on
their methodological claim that legal decisions on matters of free
exercise and nonestablishment are necessarily unreasoned,
patternless, or ad hoc.56 Against those claims, I argue that legal
actors can use a coherence approach to reach conclusions backed
by reasons, even in areas of law that depend on variegated values
and have long been plagued by contradiction. Comparing new
56 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 25–45. For examples of works with which I engage in my
book, see, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Decentralizing Religious and Secular Accommodations,
in INSTITUTIONALIZING RIGHTS AND RELIGION: COMPETING SUPREMACIES 108, 109 (Leora
F. Batnitzky and Hanoch Dagan eds., 2017) (arguing there is no neutral ground for
resolving “reasonable and deep disagreement” on questions such as the proper scope of
religious accommodations from civil rights laws); STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 1–13 (2014); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 22 (1999) (addressing legal reasoning more
generally); Stanley Fish, Symposium: Is Religion Outdated (As a Constitutional
Category)?: Where’s the Beef?, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1037, 1043 (2014) (“cases involving
free exercise exemptions and the danger of establishment continue to arise and must be
dealt with, and there is no satisfactorily rational way of dealing with them”).
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problems to existing precedents and principles that abstract from
them, lawyers and judges can find solutions that fit with existing
commitments. Without treating any of those commitments as
foundational or fixed, but instead subjecting them to
reexamination in light of new information or insights, they can
reach conclusions that cohere with one another and therefore are
backed by reasons. They can reach conclusions that are justified
in that sense.57 Because this process is influenced by cultural and
political dynamics, including the activities of popular movements
and political mobilizations, I argue that coherence methods in
constitutional law have a social dimension.58 Although the
coherence method may seem familiar from common-law
reasoning, a defense is productive today and perhaps even
provocative, as Laura Underkuffler notices in her review.59
In the book, I acknowledge some overlap between the
skeptics’ way of working on problems of religious freedom and my
own.60 Here, I want to acknowledge some substantive agreement
as well. For example, I agree that free exercise and
nonestablishment doctrines, as currently constituted, are
unstable and difficult to defend on principled grounds. Moreover,
the skeptics are right to say that religion-clause law is virtually
impossible to rationalize using conventional legal categories. So
the main difference between our positions is really
methodological: the skeptics believe that giving reasons or
justifications for religious freedom outcomes is impossible under
modern conditions, whereas I chart a way forward.
An implication of my argument in this Part is that the
concept of religion must often be expanded beyond its
conventional meaning to accommodate the constitutional or
statutory commitments that inform a particular doctrine.
Another way of thinking about this implication, however, is that
the conventional “religion” category ought not to carry special

57 I distinguish between problems of justification, which I argue can be resolved, and
problems of epistemology or ontology, which I bracket.
58 Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Rule of Law and Socially Constructed Reasons:
Marriage Equality and Religious Accommodation
5 J.L. RELIGION & ST. (forthcoming, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2915601.
59 Underkuffler, supra note 12, at 1.
60 See, e.g., TEBBE, supra note 11, at 7–8.
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significance in legal discourse. The next Part pursues that
suspicion.
II. Religion’s Specialness
Arguments that religion ought not to receive special
constitutional consideration, nor be saddled with special burdens,
have become familiar in the legal literature, even if they remain
unconventional.61 Their key insight, for my purposes here, is that
whatever the principles driving First Amendment law may be, it
is difficult to see how they support treating religion differently
from all nonreligious beliefs and practices.62 If our conception of
the First Amendment is not formalistic, then its scope should
track the provision’s underlying rationales. If those rationales
are not explicitly theological, as they cannot be in a
constitutional democracy, then they will protect ideologies and
identifications that extend beyond religion itself.
For example, consider the rule against government
discrimination on the basis of faith or sect. Any plausible
commitment driving that rule must apply beyond the
conventional understanding of “religion” to include, say,
nonbelievers and freethinkers who are targeted because of their
beliefs. In much the same way, other areas of First Amendment
law ought to protect—or burden—categories of citizens who fall
outside the commonplace understanding of what it means to be
religious.
There is an equality principle at work here: government
action that treats religious and nonreligious actors differently
can effect unfairness when those actors are similarly situated
with respect to the relevant public values. So the argument has a
place in work on religious freedom and equality law, even though
it is somewhat orthogonal to the conflict between religion and
civil rights that forms the subject matter of Religious Freedom in
an Egalitarian Age.
61 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND

CONSTITUTION 126 (2007); BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 4 (2013); Micah
Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1355 (2012).
62 See Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 485
(2017) (acknowledging the argument that free exercise is under or over-inclusive with
respect to any of the values that drive the doctrine, but arguing that this is true of all
constitutional rights).
THE
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In the book, I simply assumed that critiques of the
specialness of religion were correct, wholly or in large part, and I
sought solutions that did not treat religion differently.63 That
was appropriate, given the focus on religious freedom and
equality law. But now several of this symposium’s contributors
are questioning the assumption that religion ought not to draw
special constitutional concern, and they are asking me to support
that assumption with arguments.
A. In Political Theory
One of these contributors is Andrew Koppelman, who
focuses his review on the question of religion’s specialness.64
Koppleman has distinguished himself as one of the leading
defenders of religion’s special place in constitutional law.65
Others have tried to support that view either by simply pointing
to the text of the Constitution, which uses the term religion,66 or
by making theological arguments that are unlikely to satisfy
secular citizens.67 By contrast, Koppleman has articulated a
sophisticated theory that aims to reconcile religion’s special place
in the text with commitments of liberal constitutionalism.68
Koppelman’s argument is that religion provides a
reasonable proxy for the beliefs and practices that American law
63 See, e.g., TEBBE, supra note 11, at 4–5, 73, 86.
64 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 1.
65 See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY 123

(2013).
66 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171, 189 (2012) (rejecting the government’s view that
the ministerial exception could be adjudicated under the more general freedom of
association doctrine, calling that view “remarkable” and “hard to square with the text of
the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations.”); see also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 S. CT.
REV. 1, 16 (making the textual argument in a more sophisticated way).
67 For theological arguments supporting special constitutional solicitude for religion,
see, e.g., KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW
(2015); JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 57 (1996); see also Michael J. Perry,
The Morality of Human Rights: A Nonreligious Ground?, 54 EMORY L.J. 126, 129 (2005)
(asking whether a nonreligious ground is available for human rights, including freedom of
religion); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Religious Freedom Irrational?, 112 MICH. L. REV.
1043, 1053 (2014) (arguing that religious liberty can only sensibly be defended on
religious grounds).
68 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 65, at 123 (arguing that religion is an appropriate legal
proxy for a distinctive set of secular goods); Andrew Koppelman, Religion’s Specialized
Specialness, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 71, 73 (2013).
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prizes.69 While it may be true that any one of the goods that
religion generates can also be delivered by nonreligious beliefs
and practices, the entire set of goods is only associated with
religion, on his view. Moreover, and I think more important for
his argument, Koppelman maintains that the category of religion
is a recognizable social phenomenon and therefore administrable
by legal actors.70 Workability provides a reason to retain the
category of religion, rather than trying to pursue the associated
goods directly.71
Relatedly, Koppelman argues that it may be impossible to
directly implement the values that undergird religious freedom
law because some of them are too vague.72 He analogizes to
traffic safety—government cannot directly implement the
conviction that everyone should drive safely, so instead it
enforces the rule that no one can drive without passing a driving
test.73 Some imprecision results, but that is unavoidable.74
Similarly, using religion as a legal category introduces
inaccuracy with respect to any single constitutional value that
animates the doctrine, but that is an unavoidable feature of legal
administration.75
Against that background, what stands out in Koppelman’s
review of Religious Freedom in an Egalitarian Age is that he
offers no reasons why law must protect religion alone, without
also recognizing profound secular commitments. Putting together
his review and other recent writings, I have come to the
conclusion that Koppelman does not in fact believe that religion
ought to receive special constitutional solicitude, in one specific
sense. He now acknowledges that no justification for religious
69 Koppelman, supra note 68, at 77–78.
70 Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1082.
71 Cf. Flanders, supra note 12, at 8 (“I take it that it is not crazy to think the

promotion of religious belief itself may be a good. In fact, far from thinking this is not
crazy, I tend to think that religious is itself a unique human good, and that religious
organization insofar as they are good at protecting and promoting this good kind of
deserve an extra kind of associational freedom.”).
72 Koppelman, supra note 68, at 77–78.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 77. Christopher Lund makes a similar argument, namely that law has to rely
on categories that are administrable and socially recognizable. Lund, supra note 62, at
515.
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freedom law applies solely to religion, and he accepts that
categories of nonreligious conviction and conduct can and should
be protected alongside religion.76 He even argues that
constitutional values should be protected directly, without
relying on religion or any other proxy, wherever that is
possible.77 Koppelman’s clarification of these positions counts as
a major development in the literature.
His argument might have been difficult to perceive in
earlier writings because he focused on combatting the extreme
view that religion ought to be replaced with some other concept
in constitutional law. Koppelman did specifically consider
conscience as a candidate for protection, but only as a substitute
for the category of religion.78 But considering conscience as a
supplement for religion, rather than a substitute, dissolves
Koppelman’s objection.79 Lawyers and judges can administer that
category at least as easily as the term religion, and they are
sophisticated enough to handle the two concepts instead of just
one.80
Actually, constitutional actors can handle more than two
categories; religion and conscience can appear on a list of
protected liberties. In fact, modern constitutions and
international instruments regularly protect freedom of belief and
practice not only as to religion, but also as to thought, opinion,
and culture—in short, comparable forms of identification and
instantiation.81 I will return to the point below, where I will
76 See also Lund, supra note 62, at 504 (“[f]reedom of moral conscience, it turns out,
serves many of the same values served by freedom of religion”).
77 Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1082.
78 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 2 (“American legal theorists have proposed a lot of
substitutes for ‘religion.’ Conscience is probably the most popular.”).
79 Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1082 (“I never have said that religion is the only
legitimate basis for accommodation, nor that conscience, as such, should never be
accommodated.”); see also Andrew Koppelman, Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and
Religious Exemptions, 15 L. THEORY 215, 240 (2009).
80 Lund seems more skeptical about whether conscience is a workable legal category
but he acknowledges that it is a “task worth pursuing.” Lund, supra note 62, at 509–10.
See also Brownstein, supra note 12, at 30 (“I … am uncertain as to how courts can identify
what counts as a secular profound commitment that is comparable to religion. I am
inclined to agree with Andrew Koppelman’s argument in his paper in this symposium and
elsewhere that there is simply no way to identify, protect and cabin the class of all deeply
valued human concerns.”).
81 See, e.g., Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, §15(1) (1996) (“Everyone has
the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.”); id. at §31 (“1.
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defend more fully against the objection that protecting other
beliefs and practices alongside religion is not administrable.82
A disaggregated approach to the First Amendment can
work, not only by varying the definition of religion, as I argued in
the last Part, but also by including other categories of protection
such as conscience or culture. Under that approach,
constitutional actors first identify the values informing a
particular First Amendment doctrine, and then they allow those
values to determine the scope of protection. In virtually every
scenario, justifications for free exercise and nonestablishment
apply beyond religion—that is the central point of the literature
questioning the specialness of religion.
Consider again a simple example: if the objective of the
Free
Exercise
Clause’s
protection
against
religious
discrimination is to ban government differentiation that
constitutes practitioners as subordinate, then that protection
should extend to atheists and agnostics, even if they do not count
as religious. Or consider another strain of free exercise law, the
one that accommodates people who have sincere religious
objections to general laws, so long as the government has no
compelling need to apply the law to them. If that doctrine is
designed to protect individual autonomy around matters of deep

Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the
right, with other members of that community: a. to enjoy their culture, practise their
religion and use their language; and b. to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and
linguistic associations and other organs of civil society” but also providing that the right
“may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights”);
id. at §9(3) (“The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone
on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language and birth.”); see also id. at §10 (“Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to
have their dignity respected and protected.”); id. at §16 (“Everyone has the right to
freedom of expression. . . .”); id. at §18 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of
association.”).
For a seminal provision of international human rights law, see G.A. Res. 217
(XVIII) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights Art. 18 (December 10, 1948)
(“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.”); id. at (II) (“Everyone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. . . .”).
82 See infra Part III.B.
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commitment and identification, then that rule should also
accommodate people with profound nonreligious objections.
Parity is demanded by the underlying values themselves, as well
as by fairness. Of course, that argument invites numerous
objections that need to be answered. But the point here is just to
illustrate that many free exercise values suggest parallel
protection for nonreligious commitments. Each rationale must be
considered independently.
That disaggregated, multivalent approach is perfectly
compatible with retaining the concept of religion in constitutional
law. Christopher Lund rightly observes that legal actors use
socially recognizable categories to protect and pursue basic
commitments.83 Lawmakers and courts use familiar concepts
partly for rule-of-law reasons, because administering unfamiliar
classes would invite arbitrariness and bias. And they use them
partly to promote intelligibility and administrability. I myself
hesitate to agree with those who argue that the term religion
cannot be excised from American law without injustice or
inaccuracy.84 But regardless, it need not be. Religion is an
enduring feature of American constitutional law, and it should be
retained partly for that reason, but that does not mean it should
enjoy any special status relative to basic First Amendment
values.
Some might worry that retaining the category of religion
in civil rights law—using it at all—will systematically disfavor
nonbelievers or favor mainstream religious practitioners.85 But
83 Lund, supra note 62, at 515 (“In the context of a written Constitution, the way to
protect all deep and valuable human commitments is by naming certain specific deep and
valuable commitments. There is no other way. We start with the ones we know, and we
keep an open mind about the rest. Religion is not the only deep and valuable human
commitment. But it is one of them, and that is enough.”).
84 Lund suggests that religion is a necessary category of American constitutional law;
he believes that some rights coverage would be lost if courts were to stop using it. See,
e.g., Lund, supra note 62, at 506 (“disastrous consequences are waiting if judges start
thinking about religion strictly in terms of [conscience understood as] moral duty”)
(emphasis added); id. at 511 (“Protections for moral conscience will in no way remove the
needs for protections of religion or the reasons why we have those protections.”). Cf.
Nelson Tebbe, The End of Religious Freedom: What Is At Stake?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 963
(2014) (solicited response to Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 903
(2014)).
85 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 30, at 8 (“Forsaking religious freedom as a legally
enforced right might entail greater equality among personas and greater clarity and selfdetermination for religious individuals and communities. Such a change would end
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the solution to that problem is to police the unfairness by
protecting nonreligious beliefs and practices alongside religious
ones, where demanded by constitutional commitments, and by
disallowing bias against religious minorities that itself offends
basic principles. When constitutional protection is keyed to
values that do not single out religion, continuing to protect
religion as such does not pose a danger of unfairness, because no
legal consequences turn on whether a belief or practice is framed
as religious.86
Koppelman is right that some critics of the specialness of
religion wish to supplant that category altogether.87 But that is
not the only way to argue that religion is not special. It is also
conceptually coherent to contend that, for any given area of First
Amendment law, other human endeavors will be protected or
burdened alongside religion.88
Again, this is the way that religious freedom is framed in
most international human rights instruments, and in many
newer constitutions, as Micah Schwartzman has pointed out.89
So the South African constitution, which resembles international
law in this respect, provides that “[e]veryone has the freedom of
conscience, religion, thought, belief, and opinion.”90 It also
protects culture, speech, association, and dignity. Those
formulations seem sensible. I suspect that if Koppelman were
discrimination against those who do not self-identify as religious or whose religion is
disfavored.”).
86 Laborde is sometimes ambiguous about whether she would retain the category of
religion, probably because she is not focused on questions of legal administration. See
LABORDE, supra note 26, at 32 (“[B]ecause freedom of religion protects a generic capacity,
it can be adequately expressed through basic liberal freedoms such as freedom of thought,
speech, and association: it need not be thought of as a distinctive interpretive category.
Whatever rights religious citizens have, they have in virtue of a feature that is not
exclusive to religion.”).
87 This is one way to read Brian Leiter. See LEITER, supra note 61, at 27–28.
88 At one point, Koppelman argues that critics of religion’s special status in
constitutional law are often nonbelievers. Koppelman, supra note 68, at 79 (“Their central
concern—an entirely legitimate concern, given the vicious prejudices they face—has
rather become protecting themselves from discrimination.”). Many of the leading critics
are not themselves nonbelievers, but even if they were that fact would be irrelevant to the
substance of their arguments. Moreover, the critique of religion’s special status has taken
on an importance in the literature that cannot be explained by the personal motivations of
any individual theorists.
89 Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 1099–
1100 (2014).
90 See supra note 81.
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crafting a new constitutional today, he likely would include some
such list. My conclusion is that even the leading defenders of
religion’s specialness are moving away from the argument that
comparable categories should not be protected alongside
religion.91
B. In Law
When it comes to legal authority and judicial
administration, it becomes harder to say that religion ought not
to receive special constitutional consideration. This is the
gravamen of Koppelman’s response to me, and of Brownstein’s.
Both argue that whatever the requirements of political morality,
religion does in fact occupy a unique place in existing
constitutional and statutory law.92 And that is a real problem for
a coherence approach, which wants to hold both that religion is
seldom special and that solutions must fit together with accepted
judgments.93
My response is twofold. First, coherence methodology
takes into account not just existing statutes and judicial
91 In recent work, serious political theorists seem to be coming to similar conclusions.
Alan Patten, for instance, has suggested that “religious commitments are part of a class of
special commitments that share some feature in common—e.g. they are connected with a
claim to normative authority, they are important for personal identity, etc.—and that can
be contrasted with ‘ordinary’ commitments that do not share the relevant feature . . . .”
Alan Patten, Religious Exemptions and Fairness, in RELIGION IN LIBERAL POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 212–13 (Cécile Laborde & Aurélia Bardon, eds., 2017) (emphasis original).
With respect to any particular value, on this approach, religion is unlikely to be special in
the sense that it is unique. This is true even if we continue to call religion and all its
supplements “special.” Patten says something a little different in another recent paper,
where he suggests that religion could be replaced by a larger category that deserves
special solicitude but subsumes religion. Alan Patten, The Normative Logic of Religious
Liberty, 25 J. OF POL. PHIL. 129, 134–35 (2016). But he ends up suggesting that religion
could be protected along with other commitments: “There is no tension involved in
maintaining that [religion] should have such significance and in holding that certain nonreligious kinds of commitment should also be treated as having special significance.” Id.,
at 135.
92 Laborde makes a similar point in her review of the book. Cécile Laborde, Religious
Freedom, US Law, and Liberal Political Theory, J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. (forthcoming, 2018)
(“The problem for Tebbe—and other US liberal legal constitutionalists—is that the
constitutional system they seek to give ‘coherence’ to recognizes religious freedom as a
special freedom; and yet their political theory is one that implicitly denies such status.”).
93 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 2 (“I will focus on a deep tension between Tebbe’s
devotion to reflective equilibrium and his conviction, stated at many points in the book,
that ‘it is no longer clear that constitutional law should treat religious belief as special, as
compared to nonreligious beliefs or nonbelief.’”).
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authorities, but also constitutional provisions that may articulate
commitments on a higher level of generality. It assimilates legal
principles that abstract from, and account for, particular
judgments embodied in statutes and cases. One such principle is
fairness to others—the conviction that the government should not
accommodate religious actors alone when others would like to
engage in the same activity for comparably valuable reasons.94
That principle can be appreciated from the government’s
perspective as well. If the values animating a particular
exemption point beyond religion, then limiting the provision to
religious actors generates unfairness. Binding Establishment
Clause doctrine includes a rule against that sort of unfairness.
Second, legal authorities do not actually enforce religion’s
specialness with consistency or without contradiction. Both
Koppelman and Brownstein argue that existing statutory and
constitutional provisions regularly single out religious actors for
accommodation.95 That is true. However, the law is complicated
and it also cuts against religion’s specialness.
In cases concerning conscientious objection to the draft,
for example, the Court interpreted a congressional statue that
exempted only those who held a “religious” objection to war in all
forms. Interpreting that provision, the Justices ordered
accommodations for two draftees who were arguably
nonbelievers. But there was a difficulty with its reasoning,
namely that the Court based its holding on a dubious
interpretation of the statute. After all, Congress had limited the
exemption to draftees whose pacifism was grounded in “religious
training and belief,” and it had specifically excluded “essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code.”96
Justice Harlan stated the obvious in his concurrence in
Welsh v. United States—namely, that the Justices’ reading of the
94 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 71–80 (defending the principle of fairness to others).
95 Sometimes Koppelman goes further, as when he says that “American law

consistently treats religion as special.” Koppelman, supra note 68,
original).
96 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965) (internal
omitted) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 456(j)). Congress defined religion as “‘an
in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
human relation.’” Id.

at 73 (emphasis

quotation marks
individual’s belief
arising from any
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statute was unwarranted. He nevertheless agreed that Welsh
should win conscientious objector status, despite his arguable
nonbelief, but Harlan felt that the result was grounded in the
Establishment Clause, specifically its prohibition of “religious
gerrymanders.”97 A statute cannot exclude nonbelievers who
otherwise fall within its “radius.” In Welsh, the statute’s “radius”
included everyone who conscientiously opposed war in general,
and therefore it could not exclude nonbelievers without offending
the First Amendment.98 Today, that has become the mainstream
reading of Seeger and Welsh—they establish a constitutional rule
of evenhandedness in accommodations.99
Texas Monthly imparted a similar lesson, albeit less
clearly.100 There, the Court invalidated a state sales tax
exemption for periodicals published or distributed by a religious
faith. Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, explained that the
class of exempted organizations or activities should fit the state’s
purpose. If Texas’s aim was to “promote reflection and discussion
about questions of ultimate value and the contours of a good or
meaningful life,” then it had to include all publications that
furthered that purpose, not just religious ones.101 To support that
argument, Justice Brennan quoted the “religious gerrymanders”
passage from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Welsh.102 His
conclusion was less clear, however, because he also reasoned that
the Texas statute actually had a religious purpose and endorsed
religion.103 Still, the Court did strike down the statute because it
impermissibly limited the exemption to religious actors, when
nonreligious citizens would have fallen within the scope of any
conceivable secular purpose.
97 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 356–57 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
98 Id. at 357.
99 See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE

FAIRNESS 61–62 (2006) (“Everyone agrees that the Court strained the [statute’s]
language considerably in Seeger. Scholars widely assumed that the justices did so because
they would have regarded an explicit line between objectors who believe in a traditional
God and other religious objectors as unconstitutional.”); Id. at 63 (“In Welsh, . . . [a]s with
Seeger, powerful doubts among the justices about a line between religious and
nonreligious objectors almost certainly explained why they so deftly dispatched
Congress’s attempt to draw just that line.”).
100 See generally Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
101 Id. at 16.
102 Id. at 17.
103 Id.
AND
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Finally, the Court in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor struck
down a Connecticut statute designed to help employees who
observed a Sabbath. It held that the statute, which gave workers
an absolute right to avoid work on their Sabbath, violated the
Establishment Clause. Although the majority opinion focused on
the harm to third parties—the employer and other employees—
Justice O’Connor wrote separately to note the unfairness to
employees who might also like to choose their day off for reasons
that were sincere and serious, including religious beliefs that did
not happen to include a day of rest. She concluded that the
statute violated the Establishment Clause in part because it
exempted certain religious workers “without according similar
accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of
other private employees.”104
Admittedly, the Court has also said that religious
accommodations “need not ‘come packaged with benefits to
secular entities.’”105 And many statutes, both federal and state,
contain exemptions from general laws that apply only to religious
actors. Brownstein and Koppelman cite these accommodations as
evidence for their positive claim that religion is in fact special in
American law, and they argue that a coherence approach will
struggle to fit them together with a normative conviction that
religion ought not to be a matter of special legal concern.
But much of the time religion has no secular equivalent—
and in those situations, laws accommodate religious actors
without unfairness. Consider the federal statute that carves out
an exemption from the drug laws for Native Americans who use
peyote in religious rituals.106 Because peyote is unpleasant to
use, there are few if any nonreligious citizens who have a
comparably strong interest in that practice.107 Or think of the
104 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
105 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005) (quoting Corporation of the

Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 338 (1987)).
106 42 U.S.C. §1996a (2000).
107 H.R. Rep. No. 103-675, at 7 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2404, 2409
(“There is virtually no illegal trafficking in peyote—Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) data indicates that between 1980 and 1987, only 19.4 pounds of peyote was
confiscated, while during the same period the DEA seized over 15 million pounds of
marijuana.”); see also Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 917–18 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between marijuana and peyote).
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exemption that allows military personnel to wear religious
apparel despite uniform rules.108 Although many members of the
armed forces would like to be able to express themselves through
clothing and jewelry, it is unlikely that their interests compare to
those of orthodox Jews or Sikhs who feel compelled to observe
religious doctrines on dress. At the very least, singling out
religious military members can be done without inordinate
unfairness. And something similar is true for the vast majority of
“retail” religious exemptions (i.e., those contained in specific
statutes).
Much the same may also be said for religious freedom
statutes that are “wholesale,” meaning they apply across a range
of contexts. Most often, they single out religious actors without
working unfairness to others—and where they do operate
unfairly, courts find ways to widen their protections. For
example, the Cutter Court upheld the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).109 That law provides
that government cannot substantially burden religious exercise
(in prisons and land use) unless it can show that its policy is
narrowly tailored to pursue a compelling interest.110 RLUIPA
was challenged on Establishment Clause grounds precisely for
the kind of unfairness I am considering here—and the lower
court actually did strike it down for favoring religious inmates
over others. When the Supreme Court reversed, it clarified that
there was no reason to think that religious inmates were being
preferred over nonreligious ones. It also observed that it was
confronting a facial challenge to the statute; specific unfairness
to a similarly-situated nonreligious inmate, should it arise, could
be addressed in an as-applied challenge.111
And in fact, where RLUIPA does risk special solicitude for
religion, courts have crafted workarounds. For instance, the
Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of a nonbelieving inmate, holding
that he could not be prohibited from forming a weekly meeting
group for atheists without violating the Establishment Clause.112
108
109
110
111
112

10 U.S.C. § 774.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–1.
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724–25 (2005).
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2005).
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In an opinion by Judge Wood, the court reasoned that it would
have been permissible to favor religious group meetings over
ordinary meetings by social groups. To distinguish that
hypothetical, Judge Wood found that atheism was a religion, and
therefore that granting weekly meetings to traditional adherents
but not to nonbelievers violated nonestablishment.113
So, in sum, unique care for religious interests is not as
easy to square with existing practice as Brownstein and
Koppelman suggest. Although judicial and legislative precedents
are complex and even contradictory, they sometimes support the
conviction that religious beliefs and practices should not be
favored. They even support a principle of fairness to others,
namely those who hold comprehensive commitments of
conscience not grounded in religion.114
Examples cited by Brownstein and Koppelman tend to
feature religion-specific accommodations without sensitivity to
whether they are working unfairness to comparable nonreligious
commitments. Brownstein, for his part, spotlights RFRA and
RLUIPA as key examples of religion’s specialness in American
law.115 But, as I have just noted, the Supreme Court has clarified
that where those laws do work unfairness to others, they may
have to be modified. And lower courts like the one in Kaufman
have used creative techniques, such as expanding the definition
of the term “religion,” to avoid unfairness that would result from
special exemptions for religious actors under such laws.
Brownstein also offers the example of Section 702 of Title
VII, which allows religious organizations to hire only members of
the faith, despite the normal prohibition on religious
discrimination in hiring.116 That law appears to permit religious
employers (and only religious employers) to do something that
nonreligious ones might like to do as well—namely, discriminate
113 Id.
114 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 71–80 (defending the principle of fairness to others).
115 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 30 (“There are hundreds of religious

accommodations in local, state and federal law, the overwhelming majority of which apply
on their face to religion alone. Most notably, in addition the First Amendment which
speaks of religion, not conscience, there is the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), numerous state RFRAs, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) . . . .”).
116 Id. (listing as an example of special treatment of religion “the exemption in Title
VII for religious organizations” and citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a)).
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on the basis of religion. However, the exemption could be
understood to ensure evenhandedness for religious groups, not to
frustrate it. After all, nonreligious organizations already have
the ability to exclude workers who do not share their ideological
preferences—say, for environmentalism or against abortion.
Section 702 simply puts religious organizations on the same
footing, on this view.117 (Remember that Section 702 does not
accommodate all religious discrimination; it only permits a
preference for people of the same faith.118) If that reading is
right, then this example actually cuts against special solicitude
for religion.
Koppelman, for his part, cites as his main example the
“ministerial exception,” which is a constitutional doctrine that
allows religious congregations to hire and fire clergy without
regard to employment discrimination laws.119 He believes that
this doctrine evidences the specialness of religion. But there is a
nonreligious equivalent to the ministerial exception, namely
freedom of association. Under that rule, any voluntary
organization can win protection from civil rights laws if it can
show that it needs that latitude in order to further its expressive
mission. For example, a Boy Scouts troop may fire a scoutmaster
who comes out as gay, if that is required by its moral code.120 I
have more to say about that doctrine below.121 But for now, my
point is simply that religious and nonreligious organizations
117 I argue for this interpretation in the book. TEBBE, supra note 11, at 155 (“[Secular
c]lose associations should have the ability to select employees who share their basic
commitments, meaning environmental groups can hire only environmentalists, even
outside policy roles. And Section 702 allows religious groups similar leeway by letting
them choose workers of the same faith.”).
118 Section 702 only allows religious employers to prefer co-religionists; it does not
allow them to engage in other forms of religious discrimination. It is conceivable that an
atheist employer might refuse to hire all religious employees. But even if Section 702
applied to atheists, it would not allow that exclusion—it only permits an employer to
prefer members of the same sect. So an atheist employer would be able to prefer atheists
over all believers and other types of secular applicants, such as agnostics, but it could not
target only religious employees for exclusion. Another reason for that conclusion is that
religious people may be nonbelievers—for instance, observant Jews can be atheists, as can
practicing Theravada Buddhists.
119 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 3. The ministerial exemption may relieve
congregations from other laws as well. See Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise
Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183, 1201–05
(2014).
120 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 651 (2000).
121 See infra Part III.D.
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should be seen to have similar degree of freedom to hire and fire
leaders in ways that otherwise would be prevented by civil rights
laws. And to the degree that the Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses offer divergent protection for associations, they should be
rethought in light of equality guarantees.
Koppelman also objects that my approach presents a “big
problem,” namely that it would require courts to inquire into
theological questions in violation of the common wisdom that
judges should not pronounce on questions of religious truth.122 I
think his concern is understandable but overstated.
First of all, some associational interests should prevail
regardless of the content of their beliefs. In those cases,
Koppelman’s problem simply does not arise. For example, both
secular and sacred organizations should have control over hiring
leaders irrespective of whether their missions demand a
particular form of discrimination—if the organizations are
intimate enough to qualify as close associations.123 Democratic
governments must leave some room for civil society to shape the
wills and worldviews of citizens, including in illiberal ways.124
Moreover, it would be inappropriate for government to limit this
protection to demands that are clearly dictated by the doctrine of
such organizations. Close associations require latitude to
discover and debate ideas—without losing protection if their
commitments are less than fully formed.125 So my argument
there does not require courts to determine the content of anyone’s
beliefs.
122 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 3–4; see also Brownstein, supra note 12, at 39
(“[S]ome discriminatory decisions by religious values organizations may be determined to
be required by the organization’s mission while discriminatory decisions by other religious
organizations may be determined to be inadequately connected to the organization’s
mission. A legal framework that results in certain religious associations being permitted
to discriminate while other, arguably similar, associations are denied such exemptions
undermines our commitment to religious neutrality.”)
123 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 80–98.
124 Here I follow Seana Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?,
99 NW. U. L. REV. 865, 865–866 (2005), and Lawrence Sager, Why Churches (and,
Possibly, the Tarpon Bay Women’s Blue Water Fishing Club) Can Discriminate, in THE
RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: HOBBY LOBBY AND THE NEW LAW OF RELIGION IN
AMERICA ,
Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, and oe Robinson, eds. 2016).
125 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 84. I identify factors that constitutional actors can
use to identify close associations, including “size, bureaucracy, selectivity, exclusivity,
commercialism, and orientation to the expression or implementation of ideas or values.”
Id.
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Second, groups that are larger and looser should still
enjoy some deference on questions of mission. Associations that
propagate ideas might need some protection from state control
over employment of policy leaders, particularly where that
control is necessary for the group to espouse unorthodox ideas.
Even bureaucratic institutions may require this latitude. But
these “values organizations” can and should be required to show
that employment exclusion is required by their missions in order
to qualify for exemptions from antidiscrimination laws.126 That
requirement follows from the primary rationale for protecting
such organizations from civil rights law in the first place, namely
allowing them to promote unorthodox ideas in democratic
discourse. Such groups do not require as much latitude to choose
their leaders as close associations do—they should be required to
show that a particular form of exclusion is required by their
mission. Because these groups are fully formed and rationalized,
their missions will be well developed and discernable. Even so,
however, I support the current rule that courts should defer to
the organizations on the question of what their beliefs really are,
and what forms of exclusion they require for faithful elaboration
and expression.127
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to interpret
theologies for two principal reasons: because judges lack
competence on such matters and because they must guarantee
government neutrality with respect to religions.128 But here, it
seems unlikely that courts will lack the competence to ascertain
the missions or values of organizations; it also seems unlikely
that they will risk any unfairness by doing so.129 Judges must

126 Id. at 85.
127 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000) (“As we give deference to

an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give
deference to an association’s view of what would impair its expression.”)
128 See Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach To Religious Doctrine: What Are
We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 857 (2009) (describing the incompetence
concern); id. at 858 (describing the government neutrality and noninterference rationale
and citing Koppelman). See also, e.g., Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Church, 344 U.S. 94, 125
(1952) (“under our Constitution it is not open to the governments of this Union to
reinforce the loyalty of their citizens by deciding who is the true exponent of their
religion”).
129 Cf. LABORDE, supra note 26, at 127 (arguing that some theological claims can be
assessed by courts, and noting by way of example that “[i]f a religious association asserts
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simply ask representatives of the group what its commitments
require.130 Any group that qualifies as a values organization will
already have articulated those commitments.
Even if I am wrong about that, however—and Koppelman
does have a point when he says that courts properly refuse to
adjudicate theological questions131—the conclusion need not be
that religious associations are treated differently in American
law. First, it is far from clear that government officials have any
greater competence to discern the moral convictions of secular
organizations, especially on comparably profound questions like
complicity with abortion or contraception.132 As Laborde argues,
the “competence” rationale for associational freedom extends to
certain nonreligious interests as well.133 Perhaps for that reason,
in its defense that a minister violated a tenet against adultery, this is an objectively
testable religious justification.”)
130 Moreover, it is hard to understand why either danger would be categorically
different for moral beliefs than for religious ones. Both competence and non-neutrality
would seem to be concerns with respect to associations organized around moral
commitments as well. Yet courts’ ability to discern a group’s moral mission (in a
deferential way) does not seem to be terribly controversial.
131 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2778–79 (2014)
(refusing to question Hobby Lobby’s contention that providing contraception coverage to
employees would substantially burden its leaders religious beliefs.)
132 Justice Alito, writing for the Court in Hobby Lobby, seemed to indicate in dicta
that the Court is prohibited from second-guessing not just religious commitments of
citizens, but moral and philosophical ones as well:
The Hahns and Greens believe that providing the coverage demanded
by the HHS regulations is connected to the destruction of an embryo
in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the
coverage. This belief implicates a difficult and important question of
religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under
which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in
itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission
of an immoral act by another. Arrogating the authority to provide a
binding national answer to this religious and philosophical question,
HHS and the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs that their
beliefs are flawed. For good reason, we have repeatedly refused to take
such a step. See, e.g., [Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887
(1990)] (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned
that courts must not presume to determine . . . the plausibility of a
religious claim”); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969).
Id. at 2778 (emphasis added).
133 LABORDE, supra note 26, at 114; id. at 129 (“Religious associations, then, have
competence-interests which justify that courts show judicial deference in their
adjudication of ministerial employment disputes. But are they the only associations that
have such interests, and the employment discretion that they justify? They are not.”).
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current law already requires courts to defer to expressive
associations when it comes to identifying their message.134
Second, government failure of neutrality can raise the same
danger of official favoritism for nonreligious groups, at least
when they are expressing commitments that are integrated with
members’ ideology and identity.
As a coda to this Part, let me address Koppelman’s
observation that “Tebbe seems to be drawn to liberal neutrality,”
which he defines as the “claim[] that state action should never be
justified on the basis of any contested conception of the good.”135
Actually, my view is somewhat different. A government could
hardly operate under such a strict conception of neutrality.
Rather, my position is closer to the conviction that government
must guarantee full and equal citizenship for everyone in the
polity. The guarantee of full and equal membership entails
government evenhandedness, but it is limited to situations where
bias would denigrate citizenship status or interfere with basic
freedoms. In the next Part, I sketch that approach.
III. From Method to Theory
Constitutional actors need a method for resolving pitched
conflicts between religious freedom and equality law. Serious
thinkers on both sides are arguing that no such method exists, or
can exist. Their reasons for this diagnosis vary. But their
Laborde uses academic decisions about tenure to exemplify the competence limitations on
courts with regard to nonreligious groups. Id.
That the state may be incompetent to assess some nonreligious commitments is
not addressed in Lupu and Tuttle’s strongly-worded rejection of the claim that the
ministerial exception may be an instance of a broader right of associational freedom. See
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1304–10 (2017).
They argue that the ministerial exception is grounded exclusively in the concern about
government competence to decide religious questions, that this is a place where “religion
must have a distinctive meaning” in constitutional law, and that the shield against
antidiscrimination law is “jurisdictional.” Id. at 1306–07. But Lupu and Tuttle do not
consider the possibility that government incompetence may extend to certain nonreligious
commitments as well.
134 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000).
135 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 2–3. Cf. Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1080 & n.6
(defining “neutralitarian liberals” as “liberals who claim that the law should be neutral
among all contested conceptions of the good” and noting that “[Micah] Schwartzman is
attracted to this position”). For an influential argument against liberal neutrality, see
Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (“I will defend
government advancement of specific, perhaps contested, conceptions of the good”).
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conclusions are remarkably consistent—they maintain that
disputes on these questions cannot be resolved with reasons.136
In the book, I propose a coherence method for reaching
solutions that are backed by reasons. No foundation undergirds
this approach, which remains dynamic rather than static.
Moreover, it accepts and even accents the reality that judgments
on matters of religious freedom are often colored by interests and
ideologies. Importantly, the method is not inherently
conservative or atavistic. On the contrary, it is engineered to
stimulate a search for justifications for views we might hold
reflexively. In Part II of the book, I then infer principles for
resolving conflicts at the intersection of free exercise and civil
rights law. Four principles in particular seem to be doing much of
the work in contemporary conversations: avoiding harm to
others, fairness to others, freedom of association, and
government nonendorsement.137 In the third and final part, I
deploy that method and those principles to suggest solutions to
ground-level problems. Four areas of civil rights law have been
most prominent, namely public accommodations, employment
discrimination, public funding, and government officials.138
Although my conclusions often match the intuitions of leftegalitarians, they do not invariably track them. And the fact that
that the method generates surprises is some evidence of its
integrity. Importantly, even where my proposals are congenial to
those on the left, they are undergirded by reasons that carry
their own authority and that must be confronted by people who
disagree.
Some contributors to this symposium are pushing me to
move beyond method and to articulate a theory of religious
freedom. I decided not to do that in the book because I wanted to
136 See Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1893, 1895 (2009); id. at 1906 (“[T]he various pronouncements of
judges and scholars in this domain come to look like a thinly veiled exercise in ipse
dixit.”). Policy prescriptions for addressing this situation differ. Some recommend leaving
religious freedom questions to legislatures. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING OVER
EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 6, 68 (2001);
POSNER, supra note 56, at x (“[T]he limitations of moral and constitutional theory provide
a compelling argument for judicial self-restraint”). Roderick Hills would devolve questions
about religious freedom to state and local governments. HILLS, supra note 56, at 3.
137 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 49–114.
138 Id. at 115–197.
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stay focused on the intricate relationship between religious
freedom and equality law. But in his review, Alan Brownstein is
asking how the positions I take fit together into a framework for
thinking about free exercise and nonestablishment—or even the
First Amendment more generally.
In particular, Brownstein wonders how it is possible to
hold these two commitments at the same time: 1) that religion
ought not to enjoy special regard in constitutional law, and 2)
that the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause
ought to be vigorously enforced.139 That is the question I address
in this Part. Although I cannot articulate a full theory of
religious freedom here, I can sketch the outlines of an account
that both denies that religion is special and imposes serious
constraints on government regulation and endorsement of
religion, conscience, belief, thought, and opinion.
Before I explain that argument, let me highlight how
much Brownstein and I share. First, we agree that religious
actors should sometimes receive exemptions from general laws.
Unlike some other egalitarians, I defend RFRA, which I think is
important for the protection of religious minorities.140 I also
maintain that there should be a constitutional basis for religious
exemptions (although strict scrutiny is too high a standard for
considering such claims). Therefore, I reject the Court’s
suggestion in Employment Division v. Smith that incidental
burdens on religion never present a constitutional difficulty.141 I
139 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 15.
140 Compare IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS

PEOPLE 228, 226–47 (2014) (noting “serious constitutional difficulties” with asking judges
to the theological import of government regulation, as RFRA and RLUIPA do). My
support for RFRA may intensify problems with the claim that religion should not be
special in American law. However, I believe there are mechanisms for managing that
tension, in particular a flexible definition of religion, supported above in Part I, and
constitutional requirements of evenhandedness, discussed in Part II.
141 See Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J.
699, 731 (2005); cf. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1128 (1990) (proposing a test that is stronger than
“toothless rationality review” but “recast[s] the ‘compelling interest’ test in a more
realistic form”). In fact, even the Smith Court carves out exceptions to its main rule which
provide a constitutional basis for religious exemptions. See Nelson Tebbe, Smith in Theory
and Practice, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2055, 2056–57 (2011). The Supreme Court’s subsequent
jurisprudence has provided further doctrinal mechanisms for religious exemptions. For
example, the Court recognized the ministerial exemption, which provides a constitutional
exemption from employment discrimination laws, even though those laws are neutral and
generally applicable. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC,
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also agree with Brownstein that the Establishment Clause
provides a strong guarantee against government endorsement of
religious commitments and purposive funding of religious
activities.
More profoundly, Brownstein and I share a certain form of
pluralism, specifically the view that no single rule or rubric can
do all the conceptual and doctrinal work across the broad range
of First Amendment issues—only variegated values can explain
and justify outcomes in cases concerning free exercise, nonestablishment, and freedom of expression.142 These are
significant points of accord, and they make more interesting the
differences between our positions. In short, Brownstein wants to
know how someone who shares those commitments can also
maintain that religious and nonreligious commitments can and
should be protected and burdened concomitantly.
A. Full and Equal Membership
The religion clauses of the First Amendment work to
ensure that everyone is able to exercise basic liberties, and that
they face the government and each other on equal footing,
without stratification or subordination. This is the core
commitment of full and equal membership, a vision of political
morality that is shared among many egalitarian theorists, albeit
often in a vague sort of way.143 Rather than a master concept, it
132 S.Ct. 694, 707 (2012) (attempting to distinguish Smith by saying that Smith “involved
government regulation of only outward physical acts”).
142 Compare Alan Brownstein, Why Conservatives, and Others, Have Trouble
Supporting the Meaningful Enforcement of Free Exercise Rights, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 925, 929 (2010) (“[R]eligion is a multidimensional constitutional interest which
subsumes and implicates several independently recognized constitutional values.”), with
Tebbe, supra note 16, at 1127–30 (describing and defending religion-clause pluralism).
Brownstein and I are not alone in our pluralist orientation to religious freedom. See, e.g.,
MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 3 (2013) (“[T]he values
which swirl around the conflicts of religious liberty are incompatible and
incommensurable.”); 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 1 (2008) (“Neither free exercise nor nonestablishment is
reducible to any single value; many values count.”); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE RELIGIOUS
LEFT AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 2 (2009) (“[T]he religion clauses are supported by
pluralistic foundations.”).
143 I have suggested this approach in parts of previous works. See TEBBE, supra note
11, at 72–73; Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648, 649–50
(2013). For one recent articulation of full and equal citizenship in the context of religious
freedom theory, see Jean L. Cohen, Rethinking Political Secularism and the American
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is a theme or guide for constitutional actors who must manage
the variegated commitments that animate First Amendment
doctrines.
In brief, full membership means that everyone can
exercise fundamental freedoms and basic human capacities.
Those include the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech and
association, and the formation of thought, belief, and opinion,
among others. As Madison put it in the Memorial and
Remonstrance, “[t]he Religion then of every man must be left to
the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of
every man to exercise it as these may dictate.”144 This need not
be just a matter of belief or opinion, but also conduct or action.
For example, Madison asks “[w]ho does not see . . . that the same
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only
of his property for the support of any one establishment, may
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever?”145 Both freedom of belief and its manifestation in
practice are basic.146
Equal
membership
signifies
protection
against
subordination of any class of citizens, including those defined by
religion. To draw on Madison once more, the Virginia bill to
support clergy offended equality because it “degrades from the

Model of Constitutional Dualism, in RELIGION, SECULARISM, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 115 (Jean L. Cohen & Cécile Laborde, eds., 2016) (“The dualist constitutional
framework thus helped constitute the political principles central to a civil-republican,
liberal-democratic polity: equal civil standing and rights for every citizen, personal and
political freedom, and the pursuit of public purposes by the political community as a
whole supported and watched over by a diverse yet vigilant citizenry.”).
144 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS
para.
1,
15
(n.p.
1785),
http://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.html.
145 Id. at para. 3.
146 I offer Madison here not because of his authority for originalist interpretation, but
just as a persuasive guide to central constitutional commitments. Cf. EISGRUBER &
SAGER, supra note 61, at 52–53 (insisting “on a broad understanding of constitutional
liberty generally . . . all persons—whether engaged in religiously inspired enterprises or
not—enjoy rights of free speech, personal autonomy, associative freedom, and private
property that, while neither uniquely relevant to religion nor defined in terms of religion,
will allow religious practice to flourish”). My approach differs only insofar as it allows for
a separately defined freedom of religion that nevertheless enjoys no priority over other
constitutional rights. As Madison puts it, “the equal right of every citizen to the free
exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience is held by the same tenure
with all our other rights.” MADISON, supra note 133, at para. 15 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not
bend to those of the Legislative authority.”147 In another passage,
Madison said “the Bill violates that equality which ought to be
the basis of every law.”148 Equal membership is vulnerable when
the government imposes special burdens on a sect, and it can also
be violated when the government grants “extraordinary
privileges” to a particular denomination.149
Of course, there is much more that can and should be said
about this twofold normative framework. Here, my point is
relatively narrow: just that the framework facilitates an
understanding of the First Amendment that makes sense of
religious
freedom—including
both
free
exercise
and
nonestablishment—without unjustifiably singling out religious
beliefs and practices. So when the Free Exercise Clause prohibits
government from discriminating on the basis of religion, say, it
does so not because of any unique characteristic but because of a
more general principle of equality that protects all groups that
are susceptible to systematic stratification.150 Or when free
exercise law demands exemptions from general laws, that is not
because of concerns that apply solely to religious actors, but
because of a commitment to freedom of belief and practice that
includes comparable nonreligious manifestations of conscience.
Much the same could be said of the various aspects of
nonestablishment and free speech law.151
In other words, the scope and strength of constitutional
and statutory protections are driven by their underlying
substantive concerns, which cannot include a simple preference
for religious actors without working considerable unfairness.
Protecting full and equal membership is consistent with the
response to religion’s specialness set out in the last part: religion

147
148
149
150

Id., at para. 9.
Id. at para. 4.
Id.
Cf. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 61, at 52–53 (“[N]o members of our political
community ought to be devalued on account of the spiritual foundations of their
important commitments and projects. Religious faith receives special constitutional
solicitude in this respect, but only because of its vulnerability to hostility and neglect.”).
151 On nonestablishment of nonreligious ideas, see Tebbe, supra note 143, at 649,
709–10. On the puzzling differences between speech and religion law, see Tebbe, supra
note 44, at 1296–98, 1301–03.
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need not be jettisoned as a category, but it will benefit from
protections, or face prohibitions, alongside nonreligious
commitments that are similarly situated relative to the relevant
constitutional values. So full and equal membership is not a
substitute for constitutional protection of religion, but instead an
interpretive guide for courts seeking to guarantee religious
freedom alongside comparable commitments.
As I explained in Part II.B, treating the religion clauses as
manifestations of constitutional commitments that reach more
broadly is consistent with much existing law. And, in fact, it
helps to make sense of seemingly anomalous elements of the
doctrine, such as the conscientious objector cases or the
ministerial exception. But the approach also elicits several sorts
of objections—some of them quite powerful.
B. General Objections
Perhaps the most powerful argument against a
disaggregated approach to the First Amendment is that
vindicating constitutional values directly is unworkable using the
existing institutions of state power. As background, recall the
argument that law regularly uses familiar categories to
implement underlying purposes, rather than trying to pursue
those objectives directly. As noted above, criminal statutes do not
direct citizens to simply “drive safely,” even if that is their
underlying objective, because that standard would be difficult to
enforce.152 Instead, laws impose speed limits, they require
drivers to pass a license test, they prohibit driving while
intoxicated, and the like.153
Similarly, on this view, constitutional law uses religion as
a category for administering values such as individual autonomy,
government nondiscrimination, national unity, and so forth.
American law could not simply say “people have a right to hold
profound beliefs and to engage in associated practices.”154 That
would risk unfairness, because judges and lawmakers would
152 See supra Part II.A.
153 See Koppelman, supra note 68, at 71, 77–78.
154 See Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1082–83 (arguing that Eisgruber and Sager’s

principle that the government should protect all “‘deep’ commitments” is “simply not
administrable”).
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disagree about which beliefs are profound, and what it means to
exercise them. It could also undermine the rule of law, because
judges’ rulings might not be predictable or impersonal. So the
First Amendment deploys recognized social categories—such as
religion and speech—to implement constitutional commitments.
That is the administrability or proxy argument for retaining the
category of religion, and it has considerable strength.155 But the
category of religion is underinclusive or overinclusive with
respect to virtually every commitment that drives the First
Amendment. And that results in basic unfairness, as I have been
arguing.156
So the next question—and the one I wish to address in
this section—is whether it would be workable to add categories of
protected or prohibited beliefs and practices. Some such
categories seem perfectly administrable in some contexts—think
of accommodating conscientious opposition to the draft.157 Or
think of protecting nonbelievers from government discrimination,
in the same manner that religious practitioners are protected.
Conscientious objection and nonbelief are socially recognized
phenomena that courts can identify at least as easily as religion
itself. And although supplementing religion in this way would
not eliminate all unfairness, it would mitigate constitutional
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness.158 Fairness seems to
require at least that much.
Perhaps someone with this objection could respond that
such a system would be too complex. Not only would protected
categories proliferate, but the list would vary with the particular
doctrine within First Amendment law. For example, atheists may
require protection against government discrimination, even if
their belief system does not demand practices that need to be
accommodated.159
155
156
157
158

See Lund, supra note 62, at 486, 514–15; see also Brownstein, supra note 12, at 30.
See supra Part II.A.
Schwartzman, supra note 89, at 1093–94.
Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1083 (observing that adding conscience to religion
as a protected category “will diminish, but not eliminate, the law’s imperfection”).
159 For example, Michael McConnell seems to believe that atheism requires protection
against discrimination, but that it does not generate beliefs that government can or must
accommodate through exemptions. Michael McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10–11 (1986) (“[U]nbelief entails no obligations and no observances.
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Yet complexity should not be confused with
unworkability. Legal professionals are fully capable of handling
intricate doctrines. If the concern is that courts will be regularly
required to make unguided judgments in order to determine legal
outcomes, then the answer is that expanding the list of protected
beliefs and practices does not require them to do that in an
extraordinary way.
A second general objection is that using the term religion
allows the state to remain neutral among faiths. Avoiding direct
discussion of underlying values allows officials to avoid having to
say that some denominations promote those values—say,
autonomy of belief or equality of persons—while others do not.160
Religion is a general enough category to allow the government to
maintain this neutrality among sects or denominations.
My approach is not vulnerable to that objection because it
retains the category of religion. Conversely, however, relying on
religion alone to implement underlying constitutional values
results in a distinct and definite kind of unevenness. We should
be no more willing to tolerate that kind of bias than we are
willing to tolerate nonneutrality among sects.
C. Avoiding Harm to Others
A theory of religious freedom oriented toward full and
equal membership may draw other objections that are more
specific. Critics may ask whether rejecting the specialness of
religion can be squared with vigorous enforcement of free
exercise and nonestablishment in particular areas of law.
Take this fascinating problem, for instance. One of the
principles that properly guides thinking about conflicts between

Unbelief may be coupled with various sorts of moral conviction . . . . But these convictions
must necessarily be derived from some source other than unbelief itself.”). I take a
different view—and I identify practices that nonbelievers may well claim are required by
their belief system and ought to be accommodated by government. For example, atheist
inmates may wish to hold weekly meetings to discuss their convictions, or they may want
to receive relevant literature, despite prison censorship rules. Such exemption claims
have in fact been brought, and some of them have been successful. Tebbe, supra note 16,
at 1156–57 (citing cases).
160 Koppelman, supra note 17, at 1080.
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religious freedom and equality law is the commitment of avoiding
harm to others.161
Normally, when government exempts observant citizens
from general laws, any associated costs are borne by the
government itself or by the public. That is unobjectionable (on
these grounds). But sometimes government accommodation of
religious citizens results in harm to other private citizens, and
when it does constitutional difficulties may arise. Third parties
can experience coercion and unfairness, raising concerns under
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. The
principle that emerges is that government should avoid harm to
others when it accommodates religious citizens. That rule is
normatively attractive, and it is embodied in much Supreme
Court doctrine, if not all.162
How does that analysis change if religious is no longer
special in constitutional law? Can it possibly be the case that all
exemptions from general laws raise constitutional concerns when
they shift harm to others? That’s the fascinating question that is
now being raised by Brownstein and other commentators.163
Of course, it proves too much to say that every exemption
from a general law is impermissible if it shifts harm from some
citizens to others. For example, disability law requires employers
to accommodate disabled workers, yet that law is legitimate even
if it results in increased costs to the employer and even if it
results in burdens on other employees.164 Affirmative action
programs in university admissions may impact nonminority

161 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 49–70 (defending the principle of “avoiding harm to
others”); see also Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, When Do
Religious Accommodations Burden Others? in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE
BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY (Susanna Mancini & Michel
Rosenfeld eds., forthcoming 2018); Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard
Schragger, How Much May Religious Accommodations Burden Others? in LAW, RELIGION,
AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 215–29 (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen,
and Elizabeth Sepper, eds., 2017).
162 For a defense, see TEBBE, supra note 11, at 52–59.
163 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 26–28.
164 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (prohibiting discrimination against disabled employees);
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining “discrimination” in part as “not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity”).
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applicants.165 And free speech law might require exemptions
from general laws that incidentally burden expression—and
normally those exemptions are permissible even if they
externalize costs onto other citizens.166 So there cannot be a
universal rule against constitutional claims that negatively
impact third parties.
Yet it may well be the case that some nonreligious
exemptions can be impermissible because they shift costs to
others. To determine this—according to the theory I have been
outlining—it is necessary to refer to the values animating the
principle against harm to others. Two concerns are doing most of
the work.167 First, there is a worry about coercion concerning a
fundamental right: individuals ought not to be forced by the
government to subsidize religious beliefs that they reject. That
insight drove much of the opposition to colonial establishments,
and it operates here as well.168 Of course, citizens are forced
through taxation to support many policies they disagree with—
but they suffer a different kind of harm, on this view, when they
bear costs because of the religious commitments of other private
citizens.169
Second, there is a concern about equal standing before the
government.170 Normally, when law accommodates private beliefs
its purpose and effect is simply to show concern for government
burdens on religious exercise. However, when it accommodates
certain private beliefs by shifting harm to other private citizens
that stratifies classes of citizens according to basic identity
characteristics. That too transforms an ordinary government act
into a violation of an individual right.

165 I am thankful to Katherine Franke and Kira Shepherd for raising this equal
protection concern.
166 Cf. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2526 (2014) (carving out a speech
exemption from a Massachusetts law that created a 35-foot buffer zone around abortion
clinics).
167 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 53–54.
168 Id. at 52. Cf. Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV.
317, 319 (2011) (reviewing the argument that “government spending to advance religion
imposes special burdens on the freedom of conscience in a way that other controversial
government expenditures do not”).
169 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 53–54.
170 See id. at 54.
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Do these two concerns have any application to
nonreligious commitments of conscience, belief, thought, or
opinion? They do, as it turns out, but that does not mean that the
rule against harm to others applies to all nonreligious
commitments.
Take for example Seeger and Welsh, the cases concerning
conscientious objectors to the draft.171 In those cases, the
Supreme Court held that pacifists who were arguably
nonbelievers could claim conscientious objector status on the
same terms as religious pacifists.172 Would someone who is sent
to the battlefield in the place of Seeger or Welsh suffer coercion
or denigration of the relevant sort? Quite possibly. That person
could justifiably say that they were drafted because of
conscientious beliefs that they rejected. They might hold, for
instance, that this particular war is immoral, without holding
that all wars are morally unjustified, as required by the
conscientious objector statute.173 They then would be forced to
bear a serious cost—risk of bodily harm and compelled conduct
that they consider immoral—because the government exempted
another private citizen with different beliefs.174
Even if that is right, Seeger and Welsh might still be
correctly decided, but reason would not be that the principle of
harm to others has no application to nonreligious
commitments.175 Instead, it would be that there is no—or only an
attenuated—causal connection between the exemption of Seeger
or Welsh and the drafting of any other identifiable citizen.176
Conscription laws contain so many exemptions, and leave
officials so much discretion, that no one sent to the battlefield

171 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 164 (1965); Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333, 335

(1970).

172 Seeger, 380 U.S. at 187–88; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343–44.
173 See Seeger, 380 U.S. at 164–65. It is less obvious that such a draftee could

complain that the government was rendering them subordinate, but the idea would be
that the government was advantaging one profound commitment of conscience over
another.
174 What would the legal source of a nonreligious third-party harm rule be? Would it
be the Establishment Clause, or some other provision? Brownstein, supra note 142, at
927.
175 See 380 U.S. at 187–88; 398 U.S. at 343–44.
176 See generally Seeger, 380 U.S. 163; Welsh, 398 U.S. 333.
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would be able to point to a conscientious objector as the reason
that they were put in harm’s way.177
Or imagine a situation where an employer seeks and wins
an exemption from the contraception mandate because of a
nonreligious objection to (certain forms of) contraception. March
for Life was that kind of employer: it was a secular pro-life
nonprofit organization that objected on grounds of conscience to
paying for its employees’ contraception coverage.178 And March
for Life did win an exemption in a lower court (albeit on equal
protection grounds).179 Would that result violate the rule against
harm to others in the relevant sense? Again, that is conceivable.
Employees of such an organization could rightly claim that they
were being forced by the government to bear costs—loss of
coverage—associated with profound conscientious beliefs that
differ markedly from their own. They could justifiably worry that
the government was taking sides in a fight between employers
and employees on a matter of profound conscience. Now that the
Trump Administration has created an exemption from the
contraception mandate for employers with moral (as well as
religious) objections to contraception, without providing
alternative contraception coverage, the prospect of nonreligious
third-party harms has increased significantly.180
Yet again, the values behind the rule against harm to
others would not frustrate all nonreligious accommodations.
Most do not implicate the fundamental liberty or equality
interests of others. Think again of accommodations for disabled
employees, or exemptions from general laws that impose an
incidental burden on speech (on matters that do not involve
conscience or comprehensive morality). So the argument that the
principle of avoiding harm to others could not possibly be

177 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 57–58.
178 March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 122 (D.D.C. 2015).
179 Id. at 128. In a similar case, the Third Circuit disallowed a secular pro-life

organization from an exemption, reasoning that the exemption was specific to religious
objections and that the organization did not fall under the definition of religion. Real
Alternatives, Inc. v. Secretary Dept. of Health and Human Services, 867 F.3d 338, 349–52
(3rd Cir. 2017).
180 See 82 Fed. Reg. 47838 (Oct. 6, 2017). Very likely, the Trump Administration
promulgated a moral exemption, in addition to a religious one, in response to March for
Life v. Burwell.
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extended to nonreligious commitments without unsettling a great
number of exemptions is overstated. Lines can be drawn.
Work remains to be done on the general issue of the cost
of rights, especially regarding the doctrine’s underpinnings in
political theory. Exactly which nonreligious convictions will
trigger the rule against harm to others? Exactly when will
deprivation of a welfare-state benefit constitute harm in the
relevant sense?181 These and other questions must be answered,
but they are answerable.
Brownstein also raises a more practical question. He
notices that I limit the principle to cases where the harm to
others rises to the level of “undue hardship” and he asks whether
courts should be entrusted with administration of such a
standard.182 He reminds readers that the Court eliminated free
exercise exemptions in Employment Division v. Smith largely
because it believed that courts could not administer the old
balancing regime without arbitrariness and indeterminacy.183 If
judges can administer the undue hardship standard in the
Establishment Clause context, he asks, is there any reason to
support the Smith Court’s view that they cannot balance private
and public interests in the free exercise context?184
My answer is that judicial balancing is tolerable in both
contexts, despite dangers that should lead us to impose limits
where practicable. With regard to the undue hardship standard,
lower courts have been using it to decide Title VII cases for years
without apparent injustice.185 Moreover, the body of precedent
181 We have taken steps toward answering the baseline question for legal purposes.
See Tebbe et al., When Do Religious Accommodations Harm Others?, supra note 161.
182 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 62–66; see also Tebbe et al., How Much May
Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, supra note 161, at 219–20.
183 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
184 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 23–24 (“[I]f a balancing test may be reasonably and
effectively employed under the Establishment Clause to invalidate unacceptably
burdensome accommodations, is there any reason to continue to support the Smith
opinion’s argument that the balancing of religious freedom and state interests is so
difficult and constitutionally improper that it requires dramatically limiting the scope of
free exercise rights[?]”).
185 Courts have deployed the undue hardship standard as a real balancing test, not a
de facto rule against religious accommodations, despite the Court’s strict interpretation of
that test as permitting nothing more than “de minimis” harm to others. See Tebbe et al.,
How Much May Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, supra note 161, at 221–22. It
is true that courts sometimes defend themselves by saying that Congress actually struck
the balance when it adopted the undue hardship standard, and that they are merely
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that they have developed can guide courts who deploy the same
standard to limit the rule against harm to others, reducing the
scope of judicial discretion.186 And with regard to free exercise,
courts in practice regularly find ways to accommodate religious
beliefs despite the main Smith rule.187 Even the Supreme Court
itself exempted a religious actor under the Free Exercise Clause
after Smith.188
Consequently, I would allow a role for judicial judgment
not only in nonestablishment cases, but also in free exercise
doctrine.189 I suspect that Brownstein would actually agree that
the Smith Court’s concern was overstated, and that free exercise
law must allow for some balancing. Therefore I would expect him
to be tolerant of such approaches in the Establishment Clause
context as well.
D. Freedom of Association
Recall that I am tracing the objection that it is impossible
both to deny that religion is special and to vigorously enforce the
religion provisions of the First Amendment. Section C considered
this argument with respect to the third-party harm principle.
Another important application concerns freedom of association.
In the book, I propose a framework for protecting the
ability of people to join together in groups—even when that
means excluding others in ways that otherwise would violate
civil rights laws. For example, a Roman Catholic congregation
may exclude women when it is hiring a parish priest, even
though discrimination on the basis of sex or gender is prohibited
by employment law. In this instance and others, constitutional
applying Congress’s standard to particular cases. Id. But judges applying the standard
here could argue similarly that the balance has been struck by the Establishment Clause,
as interpreted in precedent.
186 See id. at 225-28 (giving examples where courts held that a religious
accommodation would not impose an undue hardship, and therefore it was required by
Title VII, even though others would be harmed).
187 Tebbe, Smith in Theory and Practice, supra note 141, at 2056–67.
188 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012).
189 Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, supra note 141, at 705. Patten
has recently embraced some balancing of private and public interests in the religious
freedom context, though he emphasizes mechanisms to limit its role. Patten, Normative
Logic, supra note 91, at 146–47.

TEBBE%2C MACRO VERSION 31.1 (3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

50

6/12/2018 1:19 PM

JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Vol. 31.1

law guarantees a right to form inegalitarian associations—
groups that reject constitutional values themselves.
My approach clarifies law on the freedom of association by
identifying its substantive objectives, which then are allowed to
guide the doctrine. Because those objectives are plural, and
because they differ with different sorts of groups, I argue that it
is necessary to disaggregate at least three types of associations
along with the rationales for protecting each.
First, intimate associations are basic to personhood and
enjoy near-absolute protection in their formation. Think here of
the family—people can select and exclude family members for
virtually any reason. Second are close associations, which are
community groups that are relatively small and selective. These
groups serve an important function in a democracy; they
influence the formation of individuals’ interests and ideologies.190
And, of course, such diversity among citizens is a necessary
condition for the robust debate that is essential to a selfgoverning polity. Close associations require latitude to select
members in discriminatory ways because otherwise they might
not be able to formulate dissenting wills and worldviews.191
Finally, values organizations are rationalized and
bureaucratized associations that manifest particular sets of
commitments.192 These groups are protected for a distinct reason,
namely their role in communicating diverse perspectives on
critical questions of the day. Yet in order to fulfill that function,
they require only limited freedom to exclude—they only need to
be able to reject policy leaders for reasons that are related to
their mission. By definition, that mission is rationalized and
embodied in institutional structures. So it is discoverable, as I
noted above. And it can be construed and communicated by the
organization’s leaders without broad exemptions from civil rights
laws.
A deliberate and distinctive feature of this scheme is that
it does not categorically distinguish between religious and
190 I borrow the term close associations from Sager, supra note 124.
191 For more on the importance of close associations for the formation of ideas and

impulses, see Sager, supra note 124; Shiffrin, supra note 124.
192 See MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 220–26 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich, eds. 1978) (describing the bureaucratized form of social authority).
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nonreligious associations. Instead, it identifies the constitutional
values behind each type of associational freedom, and it shows
how those values suggest protection for both religious and
nonreligious groups. None of the categories matter in any
formalistic way—they simply help differentiate the various
purposes served by the law of associational freedom. And because
those values can combine in particular cases, these types can be
blended in practice.
If religious and nonreligious associations are treated
similarly, someone might ask, doesn’t that raise the worry that
either some congregations will go unprotected, or close
associations will have too much latitude to ignore civil rights
protections?193 If all local congregations qualify as close
associations, as it seems they must, won’t the category will sweep
in so many nonreligious organizations that it will allow
widespread discrimination against members of protected groups?
According to this worry, exemptions from civil rights laws can be
kept within reasonable bounds only by cabining the category of
close associations to religious congregations.194 There is no other
administrable mechanism for striking a balance between
associational freedom and equal citizenship. Religion must be
special here, or else civil rights will be unduly compromised.
These fears are exaggerated. Before I explain why, it’s
helpful to recall my affirmative case. Maintaining the status quo
results in another sort of unfairness, namely inequity between
religious and nonreligious associations. What justification could
there be for categorically withholding from nonreligious groups
the freedom to associate (and disassociate), when that liberty is
enjoyed by religious ones? Think of religious and nonreligious
local fraternal organizations, for instance. Both are organized
around community service and charity work, let us assume, and
both otherwise qualify as close associations, let us assume
further.195 Would we really let one but not the other select
members on discriminatory grounds?
193 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 42.
194 Id.
195 The criterion I offer for identifying close associations includes size, bureaucracy,

selectivity, exclusivity, commercialism, and orientation toward the expression or
implementation of ideas or values. TEBBE, supra note __, at 84. These criteria are drawn
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To overcome that unfairness, one needs a strong reason.
Yet the one offered by this criticism is merely pragmatic: that
protecting religious and nonreligious associations alike would
simply result in too much discrimination. We need to draw a line,
and the line around the category of religion is socially available
and judicially administrable.196
My answer is twofold but straightforward. First, relatively
few groups will qualify as close associations. And qualifying as a
close association only triggers a presumption, which the
government can overcome by showing its policies are necessary
for the pursuit of a compelling interest.197
Let’s unpack my two responses. Close associations are
distinguished by the state’s recognition that any democracy must
preserve a social space for the independent formation of interests
and ideologies. That is even true, or maybe especially true, where
the ideas are illiberal or exclusionary. Since bonds of trust and
identification are important to will formation, they are protected
from government intrusion—but they characterize only a few
organizations outside the family.
Rather than simply directing constitutional actors to
protect close associations, defined as groups knit together tightly
enough to incubate independent ideas, the law of association
provides several identifying characteristics that can be
administered by constitutional actors. So courts inquire into the
group’s size, bureaucracy, selectivity, exclusivity, commercialism,
and orientation to ideas.198 These factors are taken from the
“private club” exception to public accommodation laws, but they
from doctrine on whether a group qualifies as a private club, such that it will be exempt
from public accommodations laws. See Elizabeth Sepper, The Role of Religion in State
Public Accommodations Laws, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 646 (2016). Sepper highlights
how courts have established what qualifies as a private club. See Wright v. Cork Club,
315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301–02 (1969);
Nesmith v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Raleigh, 397 F.2d 96, 101–02 (4th Cir. 1968).
196 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 50 (“American society intuitively recognizes that
religious groups, notwithstanding all of the good that they do for their own members and
the community at large, are intrinsically exclusionary. That intuition, I suggest, is not so
commonly accepted for other kinds of associations in our society. The fact that the
exclusionary nature of religious associations is recognized to be distinctive and deserving
of greater protection from the mandates of civil rights laws than secular associations may
be a valuable working arrangement that maximizes both religious liberty and antidiscrimination principles.”).
197 TEBBE, supra note 11, at 84–85.
198 See id. at 84 (citing Sepper, supra note 195, at 646).
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also help to orient the constitutional exemption.199 They have
often been applied by courts, providing a rich set of precedents to
guide judges. And although they are readily administrable, they
should be interpreted and enforced with an eye to the animating
purposes of associational law. When that is done properly, few
groups will qualify as close associations.
Once a group is recognized as a close association, it enjoys
a presumption of protection in its decisions over inclusion and
exclusion. However, that presumption can be overcome if the
government can show that enforcement against the group is
necessary to vindicate a policy of the highest order. Here, my
proposal tracks the Court’s actual jurisprudence.200 In the
context of civil rights laws, the government often will have
compelling reasons for enforcing antidiscrimination measures,
namely ensuring equal economic opportunity, guarding against
unequal standing in the social and political communities, and
communicating disapproval of bias.201 Those ends, taken
seriously, give the government an overriding reason not just to
enact civil rights laws in the first place, but also to deny an
exemption to an individual practitioner. Accommodating even a
199 See Sepper, supra note 195, at 649–50 (“The Supreme Court’s analysis of
constitutional freedom of association tracks this statutory distinction between private
club and public accommodation.”).
200 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615–16, 623 (1984) (“The right to
associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on that right
may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to
the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms.”); see also Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 648 (2000) (reiterating the compelling interest test for freedom of association and
quoting the language above from Jaycees).
201 This is why I think Brownstein is incorrect to say that “[b]asically, [Tebbe] urges
us to expand the scope of exemptions from anti-discrimination laws for secular
associations – particularly for close associations.” Brownstein, supra note 12, at 43.
On the three purposes of antidiscrimination law, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 9–12 (1996) (describing the accepted
purposes of antidiscrimination law); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious
Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619,
627–628 (2015) (same).
On antidiscrimination as a compelling interest, compare the majority opinion in
Hobby Lobby: “The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring,
for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal
sanction. Our decision today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling
interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard
to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that
critical goal.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2783 (2014).
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single instance of discrimination on the basis of a protected
characteristic—think of race or sex—can normalize bias and
undermine the communicative impact of equality law.
Applying this framework to both religious and
nonreligious associations may be seen to create the dilemma
identified earlier. Either too few religious organizations will be
protected from civil rights laws, or too many nonreligious
associations will be exempt, allowing excessive discrimination.
Granting religious congregations special accommodations from
civil rights laws seems to avoid this dilemma, because
nonreligious groups will be held more strictly to equality laws
and thereby the total amount of social discrimination will be
confined to tolerable levels.202
Yet, again, this way of thinking risks unfairness between
religious and nonreligious organizations.203 That is the reason for
applying the same rules to both of them, after all: none of the
justifications for allowing associations to practice exclusion are
specific to religious congregations or denominations. Especially
with regard to the values that drive freedom for close
associations in a democracy—commitments to the importance of
independent discovery and to the free development of wills and
worldviews—nonreligious groups are similarly situated.204 I
doubt whether faith associations have unique combinations of
characteristics,205 but even if that were true it would not provide
a reason to treat them differently in principle.
202 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 50.
203 See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.
204 Sepper points out that public accommodations law has looked to factors indicating

closeness or privacy to decide which groups get protected—it has not drawn a line
between secular and religious groups. “In what has been a stable public-private divide,
the state regulates commercial and quasi-commercial entities in the interest of equality,
while giving private associations license to discriminate in the interest of their in-turning
nature. Statutory law and constitutional doctrine has not drawn a distinction between
religious and secular, but rather has relied on multi-factor analysis (including profit
status, commercial nature, selectivity, exclusivity, and intimacy of an entity) to police the
public-private line.” Sepper, supra note 195, at 637.
205 Compare Brownstein’s view: “Religious congregations connect with family life
more than any other kind of association in our society. Religion relates to marriage,
procreation, child rearing, life cycle changes, and the death of family members. For
devoutly religious people, religion is an intrinsic part of their family association. Religious
congregations are obviously involved in value formation and the transmission of values
within the religious community. Religious associations are also a voice in the market
place of ideas. While national or regional religious associations may be speakers and idea
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Can secular and sacred groups be analyzed together
under the framework I have proposed, without under-protecting
the former or overprotecting the latter?206 I think so. Virtually all
local congregations will qualify as close associations, so that they
can exclude non-adherents without legal reprisal. It is highly
doubtful that a municipality or state could identify reasons
strong enough to overcome that kind of membership boundary.
Perhaps the outcome would be different for a megachurch whose
character is entirely different, so that insulation from
antidiscrimination law would no longer serve the objectives of
associational freedom. Or perhaps a group like scientology would
be deemed too commercial to qualify (without questioning
whether it is a religion). Yet other examples are difficult to
imagine.
For nonreligious associations, courts and other
constitutional actors would have to decide first whether the
assembly counted as a close association, and then—assuming it
did—whether the government’s regulation of membership choices
satisfied strict scrutiny. Some would fail the first test. In Jaycees,
the Court arguably suggested that the Jaycees could not be
considered an expressive association in the first place.207
Similarly, county bar associations are designed to promote
networking among legal professionals, among other goals, and
they therefore are too commercialized to merit insulation from
civil rights laws.208 In other words, these groups are not

communicators at the state or national level, religious congregations have a voice at the
local level. I doubt any secular association can demonstrate the depth and breadth of
religious associations across these categorical lines.” Brownstein, supra note 12, at 39.
206 Brownstein says that it is difficult to do both, and therefore my theory occupies a
position “between a rock and a hard place.” Id. at 43.
207 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) (“There is…no basis in the
record for concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the
organization’s ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred
views.”). The opinion was ambiguous as to whether the Jaycees failed the threshold test
or whether the public accommodations law was sufficiently tailored to the compelling
interest in combatting gender discrimination.
208 Ethnically-specific bar associations, like those described by Brownstein, may
promote professional advancement among a particular group without the ability to
exclude members in discriminatory ways. And the Christian Legal Society, which
Brownstein also mentions, seems quite distinct from a bar association. Brownstein, supra
note 12, at 46–47.
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primarily organized to form wills and promote worldviews, but
instead they exist to promote professional advancement.209
Other groups may easily qualify as close associations but
still be denied protection because their interest in membership
exclusion is overbalanced by the state’s antidiscrimination
imperative.210 Think here of the Little League or AYSO, the
children’s soccer organization.211 Even assuming these groups
exist in part to foster certain values in children, and even if they
feature the bonds of trust and identification necessary for
effective exploration of basic commitments, lawmakers may well
be able to require them to be open to everyone on
nondiscriminatory
terms.
The
threefold
goals
of
nondiscrimination law—economic opportunity, equal citizenship,
and disapproval of inequality—may justify ensuring that
children and their families have equal access to such basic
institutions of civil society.212
In between, there will be borderline groups that may or
may not receive First Amendment protection for associational
decisions, depending either on the threshold determination or on
the subsequent test. Again, the Jaycees themselves presented a
difficult case. Or think of sports clubs, intellectual organizations,
and music groups.213 Courts will have to make contextualized
determinations in these situations, but they will engage in those
inquiries with the help of developed case law. Unfairness will
certainly be a risk—but perhaps that danger should be preferred
209 Parent teacher associations should be analyzed similarly because although public
schools are involved in will formation, they are engaged in that endeavor on behalf of the
state and for public-regarding reasons. Cf. Brownstein, supra note 12 at 48–49. Parent
teacher associations, like public schools themselves, should be open on a
nondiscriminatory basis. Id. at 48.
210 Flanders wonders why these groups should enjoy a presumption of protection,
even if the government’s interests defeat that presumption. Flanders, supra note 12, at 6.
My answer is that they serve democratic interests in independent will formation. This
entitles them to the presumption, but it does not necessarily entitle them to protection.
211 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 46 (offering these examples).
212 As Brownstein says, there is a danger that “[m]inorities may be systematically
shut out of the public life of the community by being denied membership in all of the
private associations in which social, political, and economic bonds are developed.”
Brownstein, supra note 12, at 45.
213 Flanders mentions private golf and tennis clubs in particular. Flanders, supra
note 12, at 6. I think these might present hard cases, but courts will be able to use the
framework I am suggesting—and that is embedded in current law, understood in its best
light—to resolve them.
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to the inevitable unfairness that would result if religious groups
were systematically preferred over nonreligious ones in the
constitutional law of freedom of association.
IV. On Symmetry
One argument that has become prominent in public
debate is that considerations of equal membership ought to be
symmetrical. Risk of subordination affects not only LGBT people
and women seeking reproductive freedom, but also adherents of
traditional religions, on this account. Traditional believers are
dissenters from a new liberal orthodoxy. Their views are just as
passionately held and just as vulnerable to disparagement,
according to the argument from symmetry.214
In his review, Brownstein offers a sophisticated version of
the symmetry point. He argues that religious traditionalists face
a risk of political humiliation, which can result not just from
outright discrimination but also from government refusal to
exempt them from general laws. He writes, “religious individuals
denied exemptions often feel disrespected and subordinated.”215
In a legal system that often carves out exceptions to its laws,
religious people who are denied an accommodation may well feel
that their “identities and core beliefs are ignored and treated as
if they are valueless and unworthy of recognition.”216
214 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Redefining Marriage Would Erode Religious Liberty and
Free Speech Rights of Citizens and Churches, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (April 29, 2015),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/04/14908/ (“Respect for the principle of equal
citizenship and equal participation in the democratic process is the only way that the
contemporary controversy over same-sex marriage can be resolved without inflicting
harm on millions of religious believers and their institutions.”); Douglas Laycock,
Religious Liberty for Politically Active Minority Groups: A Response to NeJaime and
Siegel, 125 YALE L.J. F. 369, 376, 378 (2016) (“I agree that there is a dignitary harm in
being refused service because of perceived immorality . . . [but] NeJaime and Siegel never
acknowledge the dignitary harm on the religious side. Those seeking exemption believe
that they are being asked to defy God’s will [among other serious infringements of
religious convictions]…. These are among the harms religious liberty is intended to
prevent, and an expressive harm on the other side cannot justify inflicting such
harms….Viewed in purely secular terms, we have intangible emotional harms on both
sides of the balance. The emotional harm to potential customers or patients cannot
compellingly outweigh the emotional harm to believers.”).
215 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 34.
216 Id. at 34. Beyond such academic writers, moreover, the argument from symmetry
carries considerable political currency at the moment. See, e.g., Elder Lance R. Wickman,
Promoting Religious Freedom in a Secular Age: Fundamental Principles, Practical
Priorities,
and
Fairness
for
All,
NEWSROOM
(2016),
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Such arguments can be highly complex, and they require
careful analysis. Here, I will limit myself to equal protection and
nonestablishment doctrines, both of which ask whether the
government has denigrated a particular group defined by
attributes such as religion or sexual identity, so that outsiders
are rendered disfavored in the political community.217 From the
perspective of that law, the question ought to be whether the
government is constituting outsiders as legally subordinate. That
inquiry is objective, not subjective (it asks about the purpose of
the law, not the motivation of lawmakers) and it is legal, not
psychological (the question is whether the government has
changed the legal relationship between itself and particular
classes of citizens).218
Government discrimination against a protected class does
subordinate in this way. For example, states that criminalized
acts of sodomy by people of the same sex, or enforced general
sodomy bans only against same-sex couples, denigrated gay and
lesbian citizens.219 And a city that effectively banned animal
sacrifice by members of a particular sect rendered them
disfavored as a legal matter.220 So too, a town that erected a
crèche on its courthouse steps, without any other holiday
symbols, officially endorsed one faith over others.221

http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/promoting-religious-freedom-secular-agefundamental-principles-practical-priorities-fairness-for-all (“The risk is that traditional
believers and their religious institutions may eventually be relegated to pariah status—
officially recognized as ‘equal citizens’ while in practical reality marginalized and
penalized for their faith.”).
217 Tebbe, supra note 143, at 651. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Creation and
Reconstruction of the First Amendment, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: ESSAYS ON FIRST
AMENDMENT LAW 36, 61 (Daniel N. Robinson & Richard N. Williams, eds. 2016) (“Surely
Alabama could not adopt a state motto proclaiming itself ‘the White Supremacy State.’
Such a motto would offend basic principles of equal citizenship and equal protection.”).
218 Tebbe, supra note 143, at 659 n.41, 667 & n.79; Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard
H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503,
1524, 1528, 1548 (2000); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal
Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000).
219 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (holding that Texas’s sodomy law
imposed “stigma” on “homosexual persons”).
220 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (“In
sum, the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The ordinances had as their object the
suppression of religion. The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria
adherents and their religious practices . . . .”).
221 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601–02 (1989).
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Yet the question here is somewhat different, namely
whether refusing to accommodate religious actors relegates them
to a diminished position in the political community. Does a civil
rights law that prohibits private actors from excluding people
based on protected grounds subordinate traditional conservatives
whose religion requires such exclusion? To take a specific
situation, does the State of Colorado compromise the equal
standing of religious bakers when it enforces a general ban on
LGBT discrimination, so that they are prohibited from refusing
to create wedding cakes for same-sex couples?222 Does the
government alter its legal relationship to them by enforcing this
law?
Start by distinguishing two understandings of these
questions. First, the issue might be whether the government has
an impermissible purpose in protecting LGBT citizens in public
accommodations. At least initially, there seems to be no invidious
purpose—after all, Colorado’s civil rights law applies to everyone
in the same way. Moreover, the purposes of public
accommodations laws—ensuring equal economic opportunity,
preserving
equal
social
standing,
and
encouraging
nondiscrimination—are all neutral as to religion.
Another understanding of these questions is that the state
disfavored religious conservatives by refusing or neglecting to
grant them an exemption from its public accommodations law.
This is the possibility that Brownstein raises, and it too seems
reasonable in theory.223 And in practice as well, declining to
222 See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 137 S.Ct. 2290 (2017)
(granting cert.).
223 Brownstein, supra note 12, at 33–34. Here I put aside the possibility, raised by
Justice Kennedy at oral argument, that Colorado officials were subjectively motivated by
contempt for religious traditionalists. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Masterpiece
Cakeshop
v.
Colorado
Civil
Rights
Comm’n
(2017)
(No.
16-111),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16111_f314.pdf (“in this case, pages 293 and 294 of – of the Petitioner appendix, the –
Commissioner Hess says freedom of religion used to justify discrimination is a despicable
piece of rhetoric”); id. at 52 (“Suppose we thought that in significant part at least one
member of the Commission based the commissioner’s decision on – on – on the grounds
that – of hostility to religion. Can – can your – could your judgment then stand?”). If the
state was motivated by bias when it applied the civil rights law to Masterpiece Cakeshop,
that would be an unusual circumstance that would not be present in most cases.
Brownstein’s claim is different, namely that refusing to grant an accommodation itself
subordinates religious traditionalists, even absent any particular discriminatory
motivation.

TEBBE%2C MACRO VERSION 31.1 (3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

60

6/12/2018 1:19 PM

JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Vol. 31.1

grant a religious exemption when others are readily
accommodated could suffice to denigrate religious adherents
under some circumstances. Recall the Newark police department
that refused to exempt Muslim officers from its ban on beards,
even though it accommodated officers with medical reasons for
needing to grow their beards.224 Arguably at least, the
department’s selective refusal violated equal citizenship.
Yet in the context of public accommodations laws this
seems like an unlikely conclusion. As Elizabeth Sepper has
demonstrated, exemptions from these state laws are rare, apart
from the common carve-out for private clubs.225 Religious
exemptions are exceptional, and religious exemptions for
businesses are nonexistent.226 As a matter of social meanings,
then, it seems doubtful that declining to exempt religious actors
is driven by any anti-religious purpose, though again this is a
question of history, context, structure, and social meanings.227
My conclusion from this short analysis is that symmetry
of subordination, though possible in principle, can be established
in practice only by considering a specific case.228 In the course of
224 Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359
(3d Cir. 1999).
225 Sepper, supra note 195, at 637.
226 Id. (“Public accommodations laws typically do not offer religious exemptions.
When exemptions exist, they tend to be limited to a narrow range of activities of religious
non-profits and to co-religionist favoritism alone.”).
227 On the other side, while the significance of religious accommodations from civil
rights laws can be concern for religious freedom, it can also represent state endorsement
of discrimination. Cf. Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational
Perspective: Religious Liberty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism, in THE CONSCIENCE
WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 13
(Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., forthcoming 2018) (“In the culture-war
context in which complicity claims are arising, the social meaning of conscience objections
is readily intelligible to those whose conduct is condemned. . . . But even when not
explicitly communicated, the status-based judgment entailed in the refusal is clear to the
recipient.”).
228 I made a similar point in the book:
This symmetry [between the subordination of sexual minorities and
religious traditionalists] is more apparent than actual; in fact,
religious traditionalists and members of protected classes are not
positioned in exactly the same way with respect to the principle of
equal citizenship. When civil rights laws prohibit discrimination, they
do not single out religious traditionalists for special disfavor but
instead express disapproval of all discriminatory practices, whether
religious or secular. In other words, the purpose and social meaning of
equality law does not target religious people, or even religious
traditionalists, and it does not alter their citizenship standing on that
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that analysis, it will be necessary to distinguish between losing
political battles and becoming subordinate in a legal relationship
with the government. To be sure, religious groups have suffered
both in the past. And it is quite possible for members of religious
majorities to face official denigration. So although the argument
from symmetry cannot be dismissed out of hand, it cannot be
accepted in a facile way, independent of context.
V. Coherence and Compromise—Method Revisited
Some of the contributions to this symposium have
engaged the social coherence method itself. Because they include
some misimpressions about the method, but also because they
raise fascinating issues, they are worth addressing. But before
doing so, let me briefly review and reframe the argument.
Social coherence is designed to answer skeptics who
believe that it is impossible to give reasons for outcomes in the
field of religious freedom—that conclusions of law cannot be
justified there. I argue that coherent conclusions are justified
because they are backed by reasons. Resolutions of new cases can
be supported through analogy to precedents or through
application of principles that account for those cases.229 No
precedent and no principle is invulnerable to reexamination and
revision, when using this method. In fact, spurring critique of
settled conclusions is close to the central point of social
basis. Instead, it combats discriminatory practices on the part of
private actors, whether religious or secular, that work to disadvantage
protected classes in the economy, in society, and in politics. Many feel
the denial of an exemption acutely and sincerely. But that does not
change the social meaning of the law, however contingent it may be.
TEBBE, supra note 11, at 118.
229 Laura Underkuffler understands this objective particularly well. She writes,
When we think of conflicts between religion and secular norms of
equality, we tend – in Tebbe’s words – to assume an area of law that is
“inherently or necessarily patternless.” We tend to think of these
conflicts as boiling down to a personal view as to which is more
intrinsically important – religion or equality. . . . [But Tebbe] rejects
the arguments of academic skeptics and others that these conflicts are
by nature something that is not amenable to the judicial task. Rather,
he argues, conflicts between religious freedom and civil rights can be
worked through by courts, using what he calls a “social coherence”
approach.
Underkuffler, supra note 12, at 3–4. I would only add that I defend such reasoning not
only in courts, but wherever constitutional interpretation happens.
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coherence.230 Even so, its outcomes count as law because they
rest on interpretive arguments that carry legal authority, such as
those from text, structure, precedent, and history.231
Sometimes the method is misunderstood as an effort to
overcome or transcend partisan conflict, perhaps by “generating”
discrete answers without reliance on controversial commitments.
This misimpression draws the critique that actually social
coherence will only reproduce partisan conflicts on another level,
where each position is backed by reasons instead of merely
asserted. And those disagreements will be no less emotional and
no less intractable.
But agreement is not goal of the method. As Underkuffler
explains in her perceptive review, “[a]lthough [Tebbe] suggests
that the antagonists themselves might find he method he
suggests to be enlightening, convincing them to abandon
preconceived notions and to come to an amicable compromise is
not the primary focus of the book.”232 Yet other commentators
sometimes do seem to suggest that agreement is promised, and
they are disappointed when it is not delivered.
Chad Flanders, for instance, notices that that there can be
more than one coherent solution to a problem. And, he says, “the
fact that there are many solutions and many rational solutions
may just repackage the skeptic’s worry at another level.”233
Later, he adds that
[S]ocial coherence may just change the way we look
at disagreements, but it may not make those
230 A helpful comparison is to Dworkin’s interpretivism, insofar as social coherence
also acknowledges the role of moral reasoning in legal interpretation. RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE 47, 52, 65–68, 96–98 (1986).
Because the method is designed to spur critique of accepted authorities, both
moral and legal, I do not believe it has a conservative bias and I resist the idea that
historical resolutions of conflicts between religious freedom and equality law have a
“determinative” role in the method, as Carlos Ball suggests at one point in his thoughtful
response. Ball, supra note 12, at 3. Nearly everything else Ball says in his review seems
correct to me.
231 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) (describing
authoritative “modalities” of legal interpretation); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189
(1987); Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 19
(1990).
232 Underkuffler, supra note 12, at 12.
233 Flanders, supra note 12, at 3.
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disagreements any less fierce, any less intractable.
We can agree that both sides have reasons, but we
may disagree about what the best reasons are, and
how to weigh those reasons. We may have gotten
precisely nowhere, substantively, toward an
agreement. We have just changed the terms of that
disagreement.234
This account is not exactly wrong, but it is based on a
misimpression. The point of a coherence method is not to lower
the temperature of debates. Actually, its effect may be to sharpen
citizens’ claims of injustice by lending them force or authority, at
least in the near term.
Rather, my methodological objective is just to defend
against the charge that interpretations and outcomes can only be
arbitrary or patternless. That charge is dangerous not only
because it could fuel an argument that judges should avoid
religious freedom disputes—or, worse, that constitutional
argument cannot be deployed by any policymakers235—but also
because undermines a crucial component of fair decisionmaking
in a democracy. Officials must be able to give reasons for their
actions, so that citizens can examine and evaluate those
justifications.236 Social coherence does nothing to avoid
disagreement, and in fact it explicitly envisions reasonable

234 Id. at 5.
235 For an argument that judges should avoid religious freedom disputes because of

concerns about arbitrariness, see SMITH, supra note 136, at 6, 68; see also POSNER, supra
note 56, at x. For a suggestion that constitutional arguments on such questions might not
be appropriate even outside courts, see SMITH, supra note 136, at 79.
236 Jeremy Kessler and David Pozen argue that prescriptive legal theories have a
tendency to “cannibalize themselves.” Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working
Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Thoery of Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1819
(2016). Such theories begin by promising to offer principles that can transcend partisan
legal conflict. But over time, as they encounter and assimilate critiques, they become
compromised, so that they no longer can rise above the fray. Ultimately, they end up
reproducing first-order political conflicts. Id. at 1823. The social coherence method may
not be subject to this critique, in one sense. That is because it does not seek to transcend
disagreement in the first place—it is, as Kessler and Pozen put it, “impure by design” and
therefore not subject to the dynamic they identify. Id. at 1831. But other aspects of my
project may well work themselves impure. For instance, principles such as the rule
against harm to others do seek to resolve disputes outside of pure political contestation
and they therefore may well be subject to the kind of dialectic that Kessler and Pozen
describe. Whether that happens will depend on the reasons people can offer against their
attractiveness and authoritativeness, and whether any responses dilute the principles
beyond recognition or usefulness. So far, that has not happened but it remains possible.
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disagreement as a fixed feature of democratic debate.237 Over
time, citizens can try to change each others’ minds, not just
through intellectual debate but also through the mechanisms of
social and political mobilizations.
When I suggest at the end of the book that preserving a
role for reasons permits a more lasting form of national unity, I
am not promising that the coherence method will ease quotidian
battles, as Flanders suggests.238 Again, it may have the opposite
effect. Instead, I am pointing toward the conviction that citizens
should be given reasons for government coercion, reasons that
they can access if not accept.239 That makes it possible for them
to resist using arguments that stand a chance of someday
prevailing.
By contrast, if citizens are subject to government coercion
without justification, they may feel differently aggrieved and
perhaps alienated. That is why I question part of Flanders’ call
for compromise. Of course, compromise carries significant
appeal—it gives something to both sides, as Flanders says, and it
avoids the hurt feelings that can accompany an unmitigated loss.
A modus vivendi solution can also defer a hard legal question in
the hope that it will be resolved outside law, through social and
political dynamics.240
But I think it is necessary to distinguish between two
possible versions of the argument. First, Flanders may be saying
just that competing commitments should be considered and
accommodated where possible. That is absolutely correct—in
fact, I seek and find solutions like that throughout the book. For
instance, county clerks with religious objections to same-sex
marriage might well be accommodated in ways that have no

237 See Micah Schwartzman, The Completeness of Public Reason, 3 POL., PHIL., AND
ECON. 191, 193, 194–197 (2004) (distinguishing between the indeterminacy of individual
reason, which is avoidable, and the inconclusiveness of public outcomes, which is an
enduring feature of any healthy democracy).
238 Flanders, supra note 12, at 5.
239 Of course, there is an enormous literature on this subject, which I could review
neither in the book’s short conclusion nor in this Reply.
240 Flanders, supra note 12, at 6 (“there are virtues to compromise, and I want to
rehearse them now and, to a great extent, endorse them”); id at 7. (“[o]f course, the
problem with compromises is obvious: compromises will always be open to the objection
that they are not principled”).

TEBBE%2C MACRO VERSION 31.1 (3).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018

CONSCIENCE AND EQUALITY

6/12/2018 1:19 PM

65

impact, material or expressive, on unorthodox couples.241 That
solution does not give someone like Kim Davis everything that
she wants—recall that she initially tried to prevent everyone in
her office from processing marriage licenses—but it gives her
meaningful protection without harm to others.
But the call for compromise might entail something
different, namely seeking unreasoned solutions as a policy
preference. At times, Flanders seems to embrace this second
version. He says that he wants to avoid situations in which the
losers are told that “their reasons [are] not looked at as
persuasive reasons or reasons at all,”242 or where they are told
that their positions “are somehow incoherent.”243 Quite clearly,
the benefit here is that those on the losing end of a government
decision do not have to face the full emotional impact of their
loss.244 Compromise also “buys us time,” during which facts on
the ground may evolve, lessening the tension between religious
freedom and equality law.245 Again, those are both real benefits.
But government failure to give reasons for its decisions—
or its affirmative effort to avoid giving reasons—risks a form of
injustice. Telling religious traditionalists that they are not
getting what they want, or not getting all of what they want,
without giving reasons entails the dangers of arbitrary power.
Striking these kinds of compromises when reasoned solutions are
unavailable is one thing. But actively preferring unreasoned
solutions seems to be quite another.
Rather than lowering the temperature of contemporary
conflicts, compromise of this second form may well raise pressure
on both sides. Justifications for government action can be
understood, resisted, and possibly changed, but unjustified
outcomes elicit pure contestation. Some of that is unavoidable
anyway. But to privilege raw power contests when reasoned
241
242
243
244

TEBBE, supra note 11, at 180–81.
Flanders, supra note 12, at 3.
Id. at 9 (original emphasis).
Id. at 7 (“No one gets exactly what they want, and so neither side is fully happy.
At the same time, neither side is fully unhappy. That is the benefit of compromise.”).
245 Id. 7–8. Here Flanders, like me, is open to Koppelman’s objection that his
“expectation [that groups will evolve toward egalitarianism] is likely to be disappointed,
at least with respect to some groups. The Catholics, Mormons, Orthodox Jews, and
Southern Baptists will not come around any time soon. Tolerance had best not depend on
any prediction that they will.” Koppelman, supra note 12, at 4–5.
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solutions are available may entail costs that overbalance the
benefits. Maybe I am misunderstanding Flanders here, but on
my reading this risk remains a worry.
Patricia Marino’s response paper, though fascinating and
erudite, seems to operate with a similar misimpression about the
strength and scope of the argument for social coherence. She
describes the approach as “meant to point us toward consensus,”
and she says that “[t]he idea, I take it, is that in the context of
legal reasoning we can find and appeal to a shared initial
perspective to generate conclusions that we all must recognize as
justified.”246 But the point of social coherence is not to generate
consensus, either about whether an outcome is justified, in the
sense of being supported with reasons, or about whether it is
actually correct, in the sense that those reasons are persuasive or
right. Rather, the point of the method is more modest—again, it
is simply to preserve the possibility of reasoned argument over
religious freedom outcomes.
A coherence method preserves the possibility of two kinds
of conflict. First, actors may disagree about whether an
advocated solution is coherent, in the sense that it fits together
with precedents and principles that the debaters agree are
authoritative. This is a disagreement about justification. Second,
they may disagree about whether the outcome is correct—they
may differ about whether a solution, though supportable by
analogies to precedents and applications of principles,
nevertheless is supported in convincing ways.
So it seems not quite right to say that the coherence
method, as I defend it, is meant to “generate” outcomes that
everyone must recognize as either coherent or correct. Rather,
the method preserves the possibility of disagreement itself. It
shows how people can argue both about justification, or
coherence, and about persuasiveness, or correctness. And
although disagreement is integral to any democracy, that does
not mean that arbitrariness is inevitable, as the skeptics would
have it.
Can a morally abhorrent position nevertheless be
coherent? This is a question that extends beyond the scope of the
246 Marino, supra note 12, at 5.
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book, but it is interesting to consider. Marino has a position: she
says that it is possible for immoral positions to be coherent, and
that the way to argue against them is on “moral grounds,” rather
than through charges of incoherence.247 That is, one should argue
that such positions are substantively wrong, rather than
unjustified. But what would be the basis for such a moral
argument, for Marino? This calls to mind Joseph Raz’s worry
that coherence approaches have nothing to say when coherent
accounts conflict—that there is no “base” from which coherence
theorists can criticize such positions.248
Whether or not this is true as a matter of general
morality, it need not be true of legal interpretation.249 After all,
lawyers and judges operate against the background of some
shared authorities, including, for instance, the text of the
Constitution, certain generally-accepted statutes, and basic
common-law principles. Legal conventions exist as a matter of
specialized social meaning, in other words, and they both ground
and constrain interpretive argument in this professional domain.
I take this to be relatively uncontroversial, except among some
skeptics.
Even if I am right, however, it means only that it is
possible for lawyers to argue that their opponents’ positions are
incoherent, as well as incorrect. For example, in the book I
contend that the Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. was incoherent insofar as it failed to account for the
rule against third-party harms.250 I would be wrong if Justice
Alito, the author of the Court’s opinion, could establish that the
principle simply did not exist. Then he could maintain that the
Court’s opinion was coherent, as he did, and I would have little to
say in response.251 However, because the precedents I leverage
are authoritative among lawyers, I can maintain that the Court’s
decision is not only wrong, but unjustified.

247 Id.
248 Joseph Raz, The Relevance of Coherence, 72 B.U. L. REV. 273, 284 (1992).
249 See TEBBE, supra note 11, at 43 (arguing that the social form of coherence theory,

as applied to law, addresses Raz’s concern about a lack of “base”).
250 Id. at 67–70.
251 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014).
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Marino raises two interesting concerns about this
approach. First, she worries that it constrains legal change,
because recognized legal authorities become fixed.252 Second, she
says the approach may discount marginal social voices simply
because they resist majoritarian understandings.253
Neither of these ought to trouble us, however. Because
people can disagree about coherence itself, as well as about
correctness, change is explicitly contemplated by the method.
After all, few legal authorities are permanent, as Marino herself
observes in her fascinating discussion of LGBT rights.254 Here, it
is important to appreciate that legal interpretations interact with
broader social and political understandings of religious freedom
and the Constitution. Over time, social movements and political
initiatives can work real change to accepted legal authorities.
Nor is it correct to say that the method skews against
minority legal positions. On the contrary, I would say that
prompting the examination and reexamination of conventional
doctrine is close to the heart of the method. Not only dominant
players, but marginalized critics can make arguments that must
be taken seriously because they deploy authorities that have
recognized force, even if only as a matter of contingent social and
legal meanings.255 And marginal voices can make claims not only
that accepted understandings are incorrect because based on
faulty reasoning, but also that they are incoherent or unjustified
because they fail to take into account certain precedents or
principles. While reasoning in this way may not successfully
escape powerful influences, it is not inherently biased in their
favor.256
Marino asks, what does it mean for understandings to be
“shared” in the sense I use that term? This is a complex matter.

252
253
254
255

Marino, supra note 12, at 6.
Id. at 8–9.
Id. at 6–9.
You could think of my own defense of the principle of avoiding harm to others in
that way.
256 I suppose Marino is right to be concerned that the approach allows privileged legal
actors to describe unprivileged positions as “incoherent.” Id. at 9. But at least it also
empowers the latter to find places where the dominant approach is unjustified or
irrational. By contrast, the skeptics’ approach would leave minority or marginalized
voices to the vagaries of pure power politics.
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Here, I will say only that legal understandings, like social
meanings generally, do have a core and a periphery. As Jack
Balkin has put it, some legal interpretations are “on the wall”
and others are “off the wall” at any given time.257 Think of this as
an Overton Window for legal discourses and institutions.258
Almost everything about this domain is contested, contingent,
and changeable. But it nonetheless allows lawyers to make
arguments that can be justified because backed by reasons—and
that is all that a defense of social coherence needs to establish.
I believe that these few misunderstandings follow from
Marino’s initial sense that social coherence aims at a kind of
consensus—or, even more strongly, that it seeks to “generate”
that consensus through some sort of deterministic process.
Without that view, her other concerns dissipate. No longer does
the approach have any difficulty accounting for legal change, and
no longer does it privilege nonminority positions. On the
contrary, social coherence opens up space for additional
contestation—it allows dissenting voices to argue that
established legal understandings not only are incorrect, but that
they also can be incoherent. These are powerful weapons. They
may well not be sufficient to overcome the countervailing
influence of incumbent interests and ideologies, but it will force
the articulation of arguments grounded in legal authorities.
CONCLUSION
Thinking broadly about religion and equality law, in the
way I have here, suggests several conclusions. First, the lessons
of critical theorists on both the political right and left must be
fully incorporated—including their teachings on the plasticity of
the category of religion. Yet that does not mean that reasons
cannot or should not be given for (at least some) conclusions of
257 See generally, Jack M. Balkin, From off the Wall to on the Wall: How the Mandate
Challenge Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wallhow-the-mandate-challenge-went-main- stream/258040.
258 See Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393–
94 (2015) (“Joseph Overton observed that in a given public policy area, such as education,
only a relatively narrow range of potential policies will be considered politically
acceptable.”) (citing The Overton Window: A Model of Policy Change, MACKINAC CTR. FOR
PUB. POL’Y, www.mackinac.org/OvertonWindow).
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constitutional law that we reach in this area. It does mean that
those justifications are likely to be dynamic and overdetermined.
Second, the specialness of religion should be rejected in
one specific sense: the category of religion should be
supplemented with other recognizable categories of belief and
practice where that is necessary to promote the values animating
various First Amendment doctrines. While religious freedom
ought not be supplanted, there seems to be no good reason not to
reduce the unfairness and arbitrariness of protecting (or
burdening) religion alone.
Third and related, a substantive theory of religious
freedom will appreciate the several values driving different
aspects of the doctrine. Moreover, it will pursue them with an eye
to guaranteeing full and equal membership in the democratic
polity. As it turns out, it is quite possible to both reject the
argument that religion ought to be unique in constitutional law
and to vigorously seek to vindicate the values of the First
Amendment. But only detailed analysis of specific doctrines can
show that to be true. I plan to provide that analysis in my next
major project.
Fourth, the argument from symmetry—i.e., the warning
that traditional religious people are also at risk of
subordination—holds some truth, but should not be accepted
uncritically. Whether religious traditionalists are constituted as
second-class by government policy is a contextual question that
can only be answered by examining the history, purpose, and
context of official action.
Finally, nothing about the method of social coherence
promises consensus or even an easing of social tensions. Rather,
its purpose is to establish that reasons can be given for religious
freedom outcomes, even as those reasons exist alongside interests
and ideologies. That ameliorates the injustice of unreasoned
government rule. It also promotes the health of the democracy,
but it does that not by avoiding vigorous debate but instead by
allowing and even encouraging government actions that are
justified.

